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Abstract
Everyday, we make dicult choices under uncertainties. The decision making process be-
comes even more complicated when more agents get involved: one must consider their in-
teractions and conflicts of interest because the final outcome is based not only on an agent’s
decision but on everybody’s.
In insurance industry, companies try to avoid making large claim payments to policyholders
(commonly known as insureds) by purchasing reinsurance policies from reinsurance compa-
nies (the reinsurer). Each policy details conditions upon which the reinsurer pays a share of
the claim to the insurance company (also known as the cedent or the insurer). To reach an
agreement, the interests of both parties must be taken into consideration. In this thesis, we will
discuss approaches for constructing optimal reinsurance policies that are beneficial to both the
insurer and the reinsurer.
Likewise, we have similar situations in real estate industry, where sellers and buyers nego-
tiate contracts. For example, the dierence between the seller’s selling price and the buyer’s
budget (commonly referred to as the buyer’s reservation price) aects the intensity of buyer
arrivals, the bargaining process and its rate of success, as well as many other parameters. We
will explore the likelihood of the buyer purchasing a property given factors such as the buyer’s
reservation price and the negotiated selling prices, which may or may not be dependent random
variables.
Of course, these are just two illustrative scenarios that make our results more intuitive and
better appreciated from the practical point of view, which has been a very important consider-
ation throughout the thesis. Furthermore, it will be easily seen when reading the thesis that our
developed and discussed methodologies can be adapted to numerous other scenarios, which
may in turn require making certain adjustments to our results. Nevertheless, we are confident
that the herein developed considerations are very general in nature and can already be used to
facilitate decision making.
Keywords: Decision making, insurer, reinsurer, real estate, buyer, seller, reservation price,
likelihood, Poisson process, premium calculation principle, risk measure, value-at-risk, condi-
tional tail expectation, copula, order statistic, background risk, systematic risk.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Life is full of choices. People make choices they feel good about (cf., e.g., Gilboa, 2011) by
examining various factors such as uncertainties and the presence of competing decision makers,
whose responses to dierent choices may be dierent. In our thesis, we discuss applications of
decision theory to insurance and real estate industries. The similarity between these two areas
is that there are at least two parties that negotiate contracts.
1.1 Methods and forms of reinsurance
In insurance industry, in order to cover all claim payments, companies transfer a part of the risk
exposure to other parties. An example of such parties is a reinsurance company. By purchasing
a reinsurance policy, the insurer enters into an agreement with the reinsurer to share the loss.
There are two methods of reinsurance: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance.
Definition 1.1.1 (cf., e.g., Bruggeman, 2010) Under facultative reinsurance, the primary in-
surer determines as to whether or not reinsurance is desirable, and the reinsurance company
decides as to whether or not to accept or refuse any risk oered to her/him.
Definition 1.1.2 (cf., e.g., Bruggeman, 2010) Treaty reinsurance is a contract where the pri-
mary insurer has agreed to automatically cede the risks defined in the reinsurance contract to
the reinsurer, and the reinsurer has agreed to accept that share of risks.
Under facultative reinsurance, negotiations take place separately for each insurance policy
that is reinsured. Under treaty reinsurance, the insurer and the reinsurer negotiate a contract
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that includes multiple insurance policies issued by the insurer. For each insurance policy, the
reinsurer covers a specified share of the claim. Under each method of reinsurance, there are
two types: proportional reinsurance and non-proportional reinsurance.
Definition 1.1.3 (cf., e.g., Schwepcke and Arndt, 2004) In proportional reinsurance, the sums
insured, the claims, and the original premiums are divided up proportionally between the direct
insurer and the reinsurer.
One main form of proportional reinsurance is quota share.
Definition 1.1.4 (cf., e.g., Dror and Preker, 2002) Under a quota share reinsurance contract,
the primary insurer cedes a fixed percentage of every exposure it insures within the class of
business covered by the contract. The reinsurer receives a share of the premium (less a ceding
commission) and pays the same percentage of each loss.
Non-proportional reinsurance is defined as follows:
Definition 1.1.5 (cf., e.g., Schwepcke and Arndt, 2004) In non-proportional reinsurance, the
reinsurer insures her/his cedent against the economic loss the latter stands to suer in the event
of specific events occurring. The amount of indemnity paid to the cedent by the reinsurer
depends entirely on the size of the loss. The reinsurer reimburses the part of the claim pay-
ment made by the direct insurer to her/his insured in excess of a specified amount and up to a
prearranged limit.
One main form of non-proportional reinsurance is excess of loss.
Definition 1.1.6 (cf., e.g., Sundt, 1984) For excess of loss reinsurance, of each claim exceed-
ing a fixed priority, which is also known as the retention, the reinsurer pays the exceeding
amount, usually limited to a specified maximum (the policy limit).
Although there are other forms of reinsurance, for the sake of simplicity, in the thesis
we only consider the excess of loss and quota share forms. For the rest of the thesis, unless
otherwise stated, we denote the total claim amount by X, the insurer’s share of the total amount
by XI , and the reinsurer’s share by XR. When an insurance policy issued by the insurer is
reinsured in the form of excess of loss reinsurance, the insurer pays
XI =
8>>><>>>: X if X  R;R if X > R;
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where R > 0 is the retention, and the reinsurer pays
XR =
8>>><>>>: 0 if X  R;X   R if X > R:
When an insurance policy issued by the insurer is reinsured in the form of quota share reinsur-
ance, the insurer pays
XI = X;
where 0 <  < 1, and the reinsurer pays the remaining part
XR = (1   )X:
1.2 Brief literature review on optimal reinsurance
Various studies related to optimal reinsurance have been reported in the literature. Given the
reinsurer’s pricing rule discussed by Lane (2000), and Kreps and Major (2001), Bu (2005)
considers finding optimal reinsurance by maximizing the insurer’s expected net income minus
some function of its variance that accounts for the associated uncertainty. Daykin et al. (1994),
Gajek and Zagrodny (2000), and Kaluszka (2001) construct an optimal reinsurance contract
by minimizing the variance of the insurer’s retained loss subject to the pricing rule of the
reinsurance contract and the insurer’s budget. Guerra and Centeno (2008) obtain an optimal
reinsurance policy by maximizing the insurer’s expected utility. Pesonen (1984), Goovaerts et
al. (2001), Schmidli (2004), Gajek and Zagrodny (2004), and Liang and Guo (2007) take the
insurer’s survival probability into consideration. Cai and Tan (2007), Cai et al. (2008), and
Tan et al. (2009) optimize a reinsurance contract under the value-at-risk and conditional tail
expectation risk measures.
Although not mentioned as often, optimal reinsurance strategies that are beneficial to both
the insurer and the reinsurer have also been reported. See, for example, Ignatov et al. (2004),
and Dimitrova and Kaishev (2010). In Chapter 2, we will discuss in detail some of the optimal
criteria in the literature.
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1.3 An overview of Chapters 3 and 4
In Chapter 3, we introduce our first approach for finding optimal reinsurance that is beneficial
to both the insurer and the reinsurer. Consider the following problem: The insurer underwrites
an insurance policy with deductible d > 0. Then the total amount payable to the insureds is
(X   d)+ =
8>>><>>>: 0 if X  d;X   d if X > d:
Recall now the method of facultative reinsurance, in which negotiations between the insurer
and the reinsurer take place for each insurance policy issued by the insurer. The insurer decides
to purchase an excess of loss reinsurance policy with retention R > 0 and policy limit L > 0.
When the claim size exceeds the reinsurer’s policy limit L, a third party gets involved and
covers the remaining amount. Let XG be the third party’s share of the claim. Then XI , XR, and
XG are given by
XI = (X ^ R)   (X ^ d);
XR = (X ^ L)   (X ^ R);
XG = X   (X ^ L);
where ^ means the minimum of the two values.
Note 1.3.1 Reinsurance companies themselves sometimes also need to purchase reinsurance.
Hence, one example of the third party is another reinsurance company. In this case, the rein-
surer (known as the retrocedent) passes on parts of the risk he/she has taken on from the direct
insurer to another reinsurer (known as the retrocessionaire). For additional information, we
refer to Schwepcke and Arndt (2004). Note that in this thesis, for the sake of simplicity, we as-
sume that the insurer establishes reinsurance agreements with one reinsurer. In the real world,
multiple reinsurers may be involved in the agreements. The reinsurer who sets the terms of
the reinsurance contract is known as the lead reinsurer. The other reinsurers are known as the
following reinsurers. When an insurance company collapses, special programs are in place to
respond to unpaid claims of policyholders under policies issued by that insurance company.
One example of such programs is the Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation Corpo-
ration (PACICC).
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When the insurer does not share the claim with other parties, the variance of the amount
payable to the insureds is
Var[(X   d)+]:
When the insurer, the reinsurer, and the third party pay their shares of the claim, the variance
of the amount payable to the insureds becomes the sum of the variances of XI , XR, and XG, that
is,
Var[XI] + Var[XR] + Var[XG]:
The dierence between Var[(X   d)+] and Var[XI]+Var[XR]+Var[XG] is called the variance
reduction when the claim is shared. Based on this idea, we propose and explore an optimal
criterion called the variance reduction approach. We then obtain an optimal reinsurance policy
that is beneficial to the insurer, the reinsurer, and the third party.
In addition, in Chapter 3, we shall use the variance reduction approach to obtain an optimal
reinsurance contract by the method of treaty reinsurance, in which multiple insurance policies
issued by the insurer are reinsured. Excess of loss reinsurance is assumed with no policy limit,
and no third party is involved. Two scenarios will be discussed in the cases when the claim size
of each insurance policy can be independent or dependent on time. The dependent case will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
1.4 Value-at-risk and conditional tail expectation
Here we consider finding optimal reinsurance using risk measures. The value-at-risk (VaR)
and the conditional tail expectation (CTE) are two of the most well known risk measures. We
define the VaR as follows (cf., e.g., Denuit et al., 2005):
Definition 1.4.1 The VaR is the maximum amount of money that may be lost on a portfolio
over a given period of time, with a given level of confidence. Specifically, the VaR at a given
confidence level 1    (0 <  < 1) over the considered time period is given by the smallest
number x 2 R such that the probability of a loss greater than x does not exceed . The VaR of
a random variable X at the confidence level 1    is defined as
VaRX() = inffx : P(X > x)  g: (1.1)
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The CTE is defined as follows (cf., e.g., Denuit et al., 2005):
Definition 1.4.2 The CTE is the expected value of X given that X exceeds a threshold value.
Specifically, the CTE of X at the confidence level 1    is defined as
CTEX() = E[X j X  VaRX()]: (1.2)
Note 1.4.3 The conditional tail expectation can be viewed as a weighted premium calcula-
tion principle when the weight function is an indicator function. For additional information,
we refer to Furman and Landsman (2006), and Furman and Zitikis (2008). Various statisti-
cal inferential tools for the estimation and comparison of conditional tail expectations have
been developed. For example, we refer to Brazauskas et al. (2008), and Necir et al. (2010).
Properties that risk measures may satisfy include non-excessive loading, non-negative loading,
translativity, constancy, subadditivity, comonotonic additivity, positive homogeneity, mono-
tonicity, continuity with respect to convergence in distribution, and objectivity. Risk measures
that satisfy translativity, positive homogeneity, subadditivity, and monotonicity are known as
coherent risk measures. For additional information on these properties, we refer to Denuit et
al. (2005). By finding the asymptotic distribution for the dierence between empirical es-
timators of two risk measures, one can use non-parametric and parametric approaches. For
additional information on these approaches, we refer to Jones and Zitikis (2005). For details
on how empirical estimators of risk measures are obtained, we refer to Jones and Zitikis (2003,
2007). Jones et al. (2006) extend the empirical tests for the comparison of two risk measures
by constructing tests for the equality of three or more risk measure values.
1.5 An overview of Chapter 5
In Chapter 5, we consider a CTE-based approach for constructing an optimal reinsurance con-
tract. Under facultative reinsurance, the insurer purchases an excess of loss reinsurance policy
with retention R > 0. Then the CTEs of XI and XR at a given confidence level 1  are defined
as
CTEXI (;R) =
1

E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g]
and
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CTEXR(;R) =
1

E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g];
respectively, where 1 denotes the indicator function. We have the equation
Cov[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g; XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
= E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)gXR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
  E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g]E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]:
In Chapter 5, we will explain why Cov[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g; XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] is
a special case of Cov[XI ; XR], and we shall also show that an optimal reinsurance contract
can be obtained when we maximize Cov[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g; XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
with respect to R. To illustrate, we shall then find the optimal retention when X follows the
exponential distribution and also the two-parameter Pareto distribution.
1.6 An overview of Chapter 6
In Chapter 6, we shall discuss a problem in the real estate industry: Consider a buyer who
wants to purchase a property, and suppose that there are a number of similar properties on the
market for sale. The buyer looks at the oers, one at a time, with a reservation price in mind.
If the negotiated selling price is below the buyer’s reservation price, the buyer purchases the
property immediately and avoids the risk of losing the property to another potential buyer. If
the negotiated selling price is above the buyer’s reservation price, then the buyer moves on to
the next oer. Unlike the case considered by Stigler (1962) and Gastwirth (1976), we assume
that if the buyer passes on an oer, he/she does not have the option to go back and review it.
This scenario is as realistic as the one of Stigler (1962) and Gastwirth (1976) because sellers
and real estate agents often have multiple buying oers and, therefore, may not wait for one
potential buyer’s reply. The search ends when the buyer purchases a property with a negotiated
selling price lower than her/his reservation price. If all of the properties under consideration
are being sold at a price higher than the reservation price, then the buyer does not purchase a
property.
In Chapter 6, the probability of the buyer purchasing a property will be formulated under
various assumptions. We will start by assuming that a buyer’s reservation price stays the same,
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and that the random variables of the negotiated selling prices are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). One or more of these assumptions will then be dropped. When random
variables of the negotiated selling prices are dependent, we consider three ways to model their
dependence: direct representation, copula representation, and background risk model. As an
illustrative example, we shall calculate the probability of a buyer purchasing a condominium
or a detached property in the London and St. Thomas area. The data are readily available in
the London and St. Thomas Association of Realtors statistical report for the year 2012.
1.7 An overview of Chapter 7
In Chapter 7, we shall summarize the proposed methodologies and main results in this thesis.
In addition, we shall also provide directions for future research.
Chapter 2
Optimal reinsurance: an overview
In this chapter, we recall and discuss some of the criteria that have been used in past studies for
finding optimal reinsurance, including:
 Minimizing the variance of the insurer’s retained loss (Section 2.1).
 Maximizing insurer’s expected utility (Section 2.2).
 Finding an optimal reinsurance policy based on the insurer’s survival probability (Section
2.3).
 Minimizing the CTE and VaR of the insurer’s total cost (Section 2.4).
 Constructing an optimal reinsurance policy based on the probability of joint survival and
the expected profit given joint survival (Section 2.5).
Of course, we have to note at the very outset that we will not be able to go into very detailed
descriptions and discussions of the criteria, but we shall give a good flavour of the criteria.
2.1 Minimizing the variance of the insurer’s retained loss
Kaluszka (2001) considers the following problem: The insurer pays a fixed premium amount
for the reinsurance coverage. Three illustrative premium principles for determining the rein-
surance premium pR are provided by the following equations:
pR = (1 + )E[XR]; (2.1)
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pR = E[XR] + 
p
Var[XR]; (2.2)
pR = E[XR] + 
Var[XR]
E[XR]
; (2.3)
where  > 0 is the premium loading coecient. For the rest of this chapter, we denote the
general reinsurance premium and the premium loading coecient by pR and , respectively.
Note 2.1.1 Three main methods are used to obtain premium principles: the ad hoc method, the
characterization method, and the economic method. It is important to note that these methods
are not mutually exclusive. For example, the Proportional Hazards Premium Principle can
be derived using both the characterization method and the economic method. For additional
information on the methods of developing premium principles, we refer to Young (2004). We
also refer to Furman and Zitikis (2008, 2009), where a class of premium calculation principles,
called weighted premiums and based on weighted loss distributions, has been discussed.
Kaluszka (2001) considers finding an optimal reinsurance contract by minimizing Var[X  
XR], which is the variance of the insurer’s retained loss, subject to the value of reinsurance
premium pR. The variance Var[X   XR] is minimized when the form of reinsurance is a com-
bination of excess of loss and quota share, that is,
XR = (X   R)+;
where 0 <   1 and R > 0.
The problem is now to determine  and R. Recall two of the methods for finding pR, which
are given in equations (2.2) and (2.3). We rewrite E[XR] as a function of pR and
p
Var[XR],
that is, f (pR;
p
Var[XR]). Kaluszka (2001) shows that if E[X] > f (pR;Var[X]), then  and R
exist and satisfy the following two equations:
 E[(R   X)+] f 02(pR; Var[(X   R)+]) = (1   )Var[(X   R)+]
and
E[(X   R)+] = f (pR; Var[(X   R)+]);
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where
0 < R < supfx : P[X > x] > 0g
and
f 02(pR; z) =
@
@z
f (pR; z) for z > 0:
2.2 Maximizing insurer’s expected utility
Suppose that the insurer’s profit I for a given period is
I = pI   pR   (X   XR);
where pI is the premium that the insurer has collected from the insureds. Guerra and Centeno
(2008) consider obtaining an optimal reinsurance policy by maximizing the expected utility
function EX[U(I)], where U(x) =  e cx for x 2 R and c > 0. Let
G(z;
(x)) =
Z 1
0
expf z(pI   pR   (x  
(x)))g fX(x)dx; z > 0;
where fX is the density function of X, and the function 
(x) maps each possible value of the
claims for a given period into the corresponding value refunded under the reinsurance policy
for x  0. By definition, the adjustment coecient z1 is the unique solution to G(z1;
(x)) =
1. When EX[U(I)] =  G(c;
(x)), Guerra and Centeno (2008) show that to maximize
EX[U(I)], one must find the form of the function 
(x) such that the adjustment coecient is
maximized.
Note 2.2.1 Here we provide some additional information on the expected utility theory (cf.,
e.g., Barbera et al., 2004). In economic theory, utility is usually understood as a numerical
representation of a preference relation. Expected utility theory imposes a particular set of
consistency conditions, which imply that the choice under uncertainty can be represented as the
maximization of the expectation of the utility of consequences. According to the von Neumann
and Morgenstern theory (cf., e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953), utility functions of
risk averters and risk seekers are concave and convex, respectively. Utility functions that have
both concave and convex regions have been discussed as well. One example is the S-shaped
utility function (cf., e.g., Broll et al., 2010).
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2.3 Finding an optimal reinsurance policy based on the in-
surer’s survival probability
Gajek and Zagrodny (2004) take the insurer’s survival probability into consideration. During
a considered period of time, let v be the value of the initial surplus. Furthermore, let pI be
the premium amount that the insurer has collected from the insureds. Finally, let p be the
maximum amount that the insurer can spend on the reinsurance policy. Then the insurer’s asset
after purchasing the reinsurance policy is v + pI   p. When P[X < v + pI] = 1, then the
insurance company has enough assets to cover the claim amount. However, the insurer will
seek help when 0 < P[X < v + pI] < 1. Gajek and Zagrodny (2004) discuss two scenarios
when P[X < v + pI] < 1, which we briefly review next.
The insurer needs to pay the premium R(E[
1(X)]) for the reinsurance protection, where
R is an increasing function and 
1(X) is the part of the total claim amount covered by the
reinsurer. When R(E[(X   (v + pI   p))+])  p, the insurer can aord purchasing excess of
loss reinsurance with retention v + pI   p. The insurer’s probability of ruin is then reduced to
zero since the insurer is paying for the full reinsurance protection. Gajek and Zagrodny (2004)
prove that in this case the optimal form of reinsurance is excess of loss with retention R, where
R is the maximum value of R  0 such that
R(E[(X   R)+])  v + pI   R:
When R(E[(X   (v+ pI   p))+]) > p, the insurer’s probability of ruin is larger than zero. If the
distribution of X is continuous and R(x+(1 FX(v+pI p))(p R(x)))  p for 0  x   1R (p),
then an optimal reinsurance policy is obtained when the reinsurer’s share of the claim is written
in the following form:

1(x) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if 0  x  v + pI   p;
x   v   pI + p if v + pI   p < x  L;
0 if x > L;
where L is such that
p = R(E[
1]):
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2.4 Minimizing the CTE and VaR of the insurer’s total cost
Cai and Tan (2007) discuss the construction of an optimal reinsurance contract in the excess
of loss form under VaR and CTE risk measures: Suppose that the insurer purchases excess of
loss reinsurance with retention R > 0. Then
VaRXI (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () if R > S
 1
X ();
where S X is the survival function of X and 0 <  < S X(0). Next, let T be the insurer’s total
cost in the presence of reinsurance, which is given by
T = XI + R(E[(X   R)+]);
where R is defined in Section 2.3. Using the formula for the VaR of a random variable X at
the confidence level 1   , which is given in equation (1.1), we have
VaRT (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R + R(E[(X   R)+]) if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () + R(E[(X   R)+]) if R > S  1X ();
where 0 <  < S X(0). Cai and Tan (2007) consider minimizing VaRT (;R) with respect to R,
that is,
min
R
VaRT (;R):
They show that the optimal retention R1 exists if and only if
 <
1
1 + 
< S X(0)
and
S  1X ()  S  1X
 1
1 + 

+ R
 1
1 + 

:
When R1 exists, it is given by
R1 = S
 1
X
 1
1 + 

:
Next, using the formula for the CTE of X at the confidence level 1   , which is given in
equation (1.2), we have
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CTET (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R + R(E[(X   R)+]) if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () + R(E[(X   R)+]) + 1
R R
S  1X ()
S X(x)dx if R > S  1X ():
Cai and Tan (2007) consider minimizing CTET (;R) with respect to R, that is,
min
R
CTET (;R);
and show that the optimal retention R2 exists if and only if
0 <   1
1 + 
< S X(0):
When R2 exists, it is given by
R2 = S
 1
X
 1
1 + 

for  <
1
1 + 
;
R2  S  1X
 1
1 + 

for  =
1
1 + 
:
2.5 An optimal criterion that is beneficial to both the insurer
and the reinsurer
In this section, we review the work of Dimitrova and Kaishev (2010), in which an optimal
reinsurance policy that is beneficial to both the insurer and the reinsurer is constructed. If the
inter-claim times, say 1, 2, : : : , are identically and exponentially distributed with parameter
 > 0, then the arrival time of the first claim is T1 = 1, the arrival time of the second claim is
T2 = 1 + 2, and so on. Let N(t) be the number of claims that arrive up to and including the
time t. Furthermore, let X1, X2, : : : be the claim sizes. Then for every i  1, the insurer’s share
of the ith claim is
Xi;I = (Xi ^ R) + (Xi   L)+;
where R is the retention and L is the policy limit (0 < R < L), and the reinsurer’s share is
Xi;R = min((Xi   R)+; L   R):
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The insurer and the reinsurer also share the premium income, which is given by
h(t) = hI(t) + hR(t);
where
 h(t) is the aggregate premium income up to and including the time t;
 hI(t) is the insurer’s share of the premium income up to and including the time t;
 hR(t) is the reinsurer’s share up to and including the time t.
The functions h, hI , and hR are non-negative and non-decreasing. Consequently, the in-
surer’s profit up to and including the time t is
I(t) = hI(t)  
N(t)X
i=1
XIi ;
and the reinsurer’s profit up to and including the time t is
R(t) = hR(t)  
N(t)X
i=1
XRi :
Let TI be the insurer’s time of ruin, and let TR be the reinsurer’s time of ruin. Dimitrova
and Kaishev (2010) search for a common solution for both the insurer and the reinsurer by
using the following optimal criterion: Suppose that h(t) = hI(t) + hR(t), hI(t) = ah(t), and
hR(t) = (1   a)h(t) for 0  a  1. Then the retention R and the policy limit L of the optimal
reinsurance policy are such that 1   P[TI > x;TR > x] is minimized subject to
E[I(x) j TI > x;TR > x]
E[R(x) j TI > x;TR > x] =
a
1   a ;
where x  0.
Chapter 3
The variance reduction approach
In this chapter, we develop optimal reinsurance by reducing the variance of the amount payable
to the insureds. Consider the following problem assuming the method of facultative reinsur-
ance: The insurer underwrites an insurance policy with deductible d > 0 and decides to acquire
an excess of loss reinsurance policy from the reinsurer with retention R > 0 and policy limit
L > 0, where d < R < L. When the claim size exceeds the policy limit L, the reinsurer seeks
help from a third party to cover the remaining amount.
Although the decisions of all three parties aect the final outcome, we assume that the
insurer does not negotiate directly with the third party. This assumption is reasonable since the
insurer does not care how the reinsurer covers the amount exceeding the retention, as long as
it is covered. Furthermore, we assume that the retention is decided between the insurer and the
reinsurer, and that the policy limit is determined between the reinsurer and the third party.
Let XG be the third party’s share of the claim. Then we have
XI = (X ^ R)   (X ^ d);
XR = (X ^ L)   (X ^ R);
XG = X   (X ^ L):
The variance of the amount payable to the insureds is
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Var[(X   d)+] = E[(X   d)2+]   (E[(X   d)+])2
= E[(X   (X ^ d))2]   (E[X   (X ^ d)])2
= E[X2] + E[(X ^ d)2]   2E[X(X ^ d)]   (E[X])2   (E[X ^ d])2
+ 2E[X]E[X ^ d]:
Similarly, the variance of the insurer’s share of the claim is given by
Var[XI] = E[X2I ]   (E[XI])2
= E[((X ^ R)   (X ^ d))2]   (E[X ^ R]   E[X ^ d])2
= E[(X ^ R)2] + E[(X ^ d)2]   2E[(X ^ R)(X ^ d)]   (E[X ^ R])2
  (E[X ^ d])2 + 2E[X ^ R]E[X ^ d]:
The variance of the reinsurer’s share of the claim is given by
Var[XR] = E[X2R]   (E[XR])2
= E[((X ^ L)   (X ^ R))2]   (E[X ^ L]   E[X ^ R])2
= E[(X ^ L)2] + E[(X ^ R)2]   2E[(X ^ L)(X ^ R)]   (E[X ^ L])2
  (E[X ^ R])2 + 2E[X ^ L]E[X ^ R]:
Finally, the variance of the third party’s share of the claim is given by
Var[XG] = E[X2G]   (E[XG])2
= E[(X   (X ^ L))2]   [E(X)   E(X ^ L)]2
= E[X2] + E[(X ^ L)2]   2E[X(X ^ L)]   (E[X])2   (E[X ^ L])2
+ 2E[X]E[X ^ L]:
Next, we follow Borch (1974) and find an optimal criterion that is beneficial to the insurer,
the reinsurer, and the third party. If the insurance company does not share the claim with other
parties, then the variance of the amount payable to the insureds isVar[(X d)+]. When the three
parties share the claim, the variance of the amount payable to the insureds becomes Var[XI] +
Var[XR] + Var[XG]. The dierence between Var[(X   d)+] and Var[XI] + Var[XR] + Var[XG]
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is known as the variance reduction when the claim is shared. Our developed methodology
is based on this idea. We call it the variance reduction approach. The rest of this chapter is
organized as follows:
 In Section 3.1, we establish the optimal criterion as maximizing Cov[XI ; XR] and/or
Cov[XR; XG].
 In Section 3.2, we check if the correlation coecient can be used as an alternative opti-
mal criterion.
 In Section 3.3, we find the optimal retention R and/or the optimal policy limit L under
various scenarios.
 In Section 3.4, we use the variance reduction approach assuming the method of treaty
reinsurance. We find the optimal retention when the insurer and the reinsurer negotiate a
reinsurance contract in the excess of loss form that includes multiple insurance policies
issued by the insurer, and when the claim size of each insurance policy is independent of
time.
3.1 Establishing the optimal criterion
When the insurer negotiates with the reinsurer to determine the retention R, the two parties
share the amount
XI + XR = (X ^ L)   (X ^ d):
Without sharing, the variance of this amount is
Var[XI + XR]:
When the risk is shared between the insurer and the reinsurer, the variance becomes
Var[XI] + Var[XR]:
We can write
Var[XI + XR] = Var[XI] + Var[XR] + 2Cov[XI ; XR]:
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Our goal is to maximize the dierence between Var[XI + XR] and Var[XI] + Var[XR]. To do
so, we need to maximize the covariance Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to the retention R.
When the reinsurer and the third party communicate to determine the policy limit L, they
share the amount
XR + XG = X   (X ^ R):
Without sharing, the variance of this amount is
Var[XR + XG]:
When the risk is shared between the reinsurer and the third party, the variance becomes
Var[XR] + Var[XG]:
Similar to negotiations between the insurer and the reinsurer, we wish to maximize the dier-
ence between Var[XR + XG] and Var[XR] +Var[XG]. In other words, we need to maximize the
covariance Cov[XR; XG] with respect to the policy limit L.
Next, we obtain expressions for the covariances Cov[XI ; XR] and Cov[XR; XG].
Note 3.1.1 Covariance plays pivotal roles when solving a number of problems in actuarial
science, statistics, economics, and finance. In our model, a closed-form expression for the
covariance can be obtained. However, in many scenarios, this can be a challenging task. One
possible solution to the task is the covariance decomposition. For details, we refer to Furman
and Zitikis (2010). In addition to finding closed-form expressions, studies related to estimating
the covariance of two random variables have also been reported in the literature. One example
is the Gru¨ss-type bound for the covariance of two transformed random variables (cf., e.g.,
Zitikis, 2009; Egozcue et al., 2010, 2011b).
Theorem 3.1.2 Let the excess of loss reinsurance policy have retention R > 0 and policy limit
L > 0. Then the covariances Cov[XI ; XR] and Cov[XR; XG] are given by
Cov[XI ; XR] =
Z R
d
FX(y)dy
Z L
R
S X(y)dy; (3.1)
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Cov[XR; XG] =
Z L
R
FX(y)dy
Z 1
L
S X(y)dy; (3.2)
where FX is the distribution function of X and S X is the survival function of X.
Proof We begin with the covariance of XI and XR, which can be written as follows:
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[XIXR]   E[XI]E[XR]:
Recall that
XI = (X ^ R)   (X ^ d);
XR = (X ^ L)   (X ^ R);
XG = X   (X ^ L):
Using these representations, the covariance becomes
Cov[XI; XR] = E[((X ^ R)   (X ^ d))((X ^ L)   (X ^ R))]   E[(X ^ R)   (X ^ d)]
 E[(X ^ L)   (X ^ R)]
= (E[(X ^ R)(X ^ L)]   E[X ^ R]E[X ^ L])
  (E[(X ^ d)(X ^ L)]   E[X ^ d]E[X ^ L])
  (E[(X ^ R)2]   (E[X ^ R])2)
+ (E[(X ^ d)(X ^ R)]   E[X ^ d]E[X ^ R]):
Next, we write Cov[XI; XR] in terms of the distribution function of X and obtain
Cov[XI ; XR]
=

R2   2
Z R
0
yFX(y)dy + R
Z L
0
(1   FX(y))dy   R
Z R
0
(1   FX(y))dy  
Z d
0
(1   FX(y))dy

Z L
0
(1   FX(y))dy

 

d2   2
Z d
0
yFX(y)dy + d
Z L
0
(1   FX(y))dy   d
Z d
0
(1   FX(y))dy
 
Z d
0
(1   FX(y))dy
Z L
0
(1   FX(y))dy

 

R2   2
Z R
0
yFX(y)dy  
 Z R
0
(1   FX(y))dy
2
+

d2 2
Z d
0
yFX(y)dy+d
Z R
0
(1 FX(y))dy d
Z d
0
(1 FX(y))dy 
Z d
0
(1 FX(y))dy
Z R
0
(1 FX(y))dy

:
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Consequently, we have
Cov[XI ; XR] =
Z R
d
FX(y)dy
Z L
R
S X(y)dy:
Similarly, we derive an expression for Cov[XR; XG]. The result is provided in equation (3.2).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.2. 
We note from Theorem 3.1.2 that the covariances are non-negative. In other words, the
dierence between Var[XI +XR] and Var[XI]+Var[XR] is positive, and the dierence between
Var[XR + XG] and Var[XR] + Var[XG] is positive. This confirms the fact that the variance of
the amount payable to the insureds is reduced when the claim is shared.
Note 3.1.3 Determining the sign of the covariance of two real-valued transformations of a
random variable can be challenging in some cases. For additional information, we refer to
Egozcue et al. (2011a).
Since the correlation coecient is written in terms of the covariance, a natural question to
ask is whether we can maximize the correlation coecients Corr[XI ; XR] and Corr[XR; XG]
instead. In what follows, we use a numerical example to check if maximizing the correlation
coecient could be a suitable criterion for optimizing the reinsurance policy.
3.2 An illustrative example
We assume throughout this section that the total claim amount X follows a discrete distribution,
and that only one insurance policy is issued by the insurer with no deductible, that is, d = 0.
The insurance policy is then reinsured. The excess of loss reinsurance policy has retention R
and policy limit L. We assume that the claim amount never exceeds the policy limit. Hence,
no third party gets involved. Denote the optimal retention that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR] by R1,
and the optimal retention that maximizes Corr[XI ; XR] by R2. Next, to check if R1 and R2 can
be obtained, we present an illustrative example.
Suppose that for 0 < x1 < x2  L, the loss X is of the following form:
X =
8>>><>>>: x1 with probability p1;x2 with probability p2; (3.3)
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where p1 + p2 = 1 and p1 > p2. Next, we shall derive an expression for Cov[XI ; XR] and find
R1.
Theorem 3.2.1 Suppose X follows the discrete distribution given by equation (3.3). Further-
more, let the retention of the excess of loss reinsurance policy be R > 0. Then the covariance
of XI and XR is given by
Cov[XI ; XR] =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 when R  x1;
(Rp1   x1p1)(x2   R)p2 when x1 < R  x2;
0 when R > x2:
(3.4)
Moreover, the optimal retention R1 that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR] is
R1 =
x1 + x2
2
: (3.5)
Proof Given distribution (3.3) of X, the covariance of XI and XR can be written as follows:
Cov[XI ; XR] = (x1 ^ R)(x1   R)+p1 + (x2 ^ R)(x2   R)+p2
  ((x1 ^ R)p1 + (x2 ^ R)p2)((x1   R)+p1 + (x2   R)+p2):
We now rewrite Cov[XI ; XR] for R  x1, x1 < R  x2, and R > x2. When R  x1, the covariance
becomes
Cov[XI ; XR] = R(x1   R)p1 + R(x2   R)p2   (Rp1 + Rp2)((x1   R)p1 + (x2   R)p2)
= R(1   p1   p2)((x1   R)p1 + (x2   R)p2):
Since p1 + p2 = 1, we obtain
Cov[XI ; XR] = 0:
When x1 < R  x2, the covariance becomes
Cov[XI ; XR] = R(x2   R)p2   (x1p1 + Rp2)(x2   R)p2
= (Rp1   x1p1)(x2   R)p2:
When R > x2, we have (x1   R)+ = 0 and (x2   R)+ = 0. Hence, the covariance becomes
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Cov[XI ; XR] = 0:
From these formulas, we see that the covariance is maximized when x1 < R  x2.
To obtain the retention that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR], we first need to calculate the critical
point(s) of Cov[XI ; XR], and then find the critical point that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR], which is
the optimal retention. We begin by finding the critical point(s) of Cov[XI ; XR] for x1 < R  x2.
Definition 3.2.2 (cf., e.g., Larson and Edwards, 2010) A critical, or stationary, point of a dif-
ferentiable function is any value in its domain where its derivative is 0.
From this definition, we obtain the critical point(s) by dierentiating Cov[XI ; XR] with
respect to R and equating the first derivative to zero, that is,
@
@R
Cov[XI ; XR] = 0:
We then solve for R. The solution, which we denote by R˜1, is given by
R˜1 =
x1 + x2
2
:
Next, we show that this critical point R˜1 maximizes Cov[XI ; XR]. This can be achieved using
the second-derivative test.
Definition 3.2.3 (cf., e.g., Larson and Edwards, 2010) The second-derivative test is a criterion
for determining whether a given critical point of a real function of one variable is a local
maximum or a local minimum using the value of the second derivative at the point. The test
states that if the function f is twice dierentiable at a critical point x (i.e. f 0(x) = 0), then we
have the following three statements:
 If f 00(x) < 0, then f has a local maximum at x.
 If f 00(x) > 0, then f has a local minimum at x.
 If f 00(x) = 0, then x is the inflection point.
Therefore, we need to show that the second derivative of Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to R
evaluated at R˜1 is negative, that is,

@
@R
2
Cov[XI ; XR]

R=R˜1
< 0:
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The second derivative of Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to R is given by

@
@R
2
Cov[XI; XR] =  2p1p2:
Since  2p1p2 < 0, we conclude that R1 maximizes Cov[XI ; XR]. This completes the proof of
Theorem 3.2.1. 
To illustrate graphically, in Figure 3.1, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when x1 = 10, x2 =
1000, p1 = 0:9, and p2 = 0:1. Note that Cov[XI ; XR] is maximized when R = 505.
Figure 3.1: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] with Cov[XI ; XR] given by equation (3.4).
Next, we find the retention that maximizes Corr[XI; XR].
Lemma 3.2.4 Under conditions of Theorem 3.2.1, the correlation coecient between XI and
XR is given by
Corr[XI; XR] = 1 for x1 < R  x2;
and it is undefined for other values of R.
Proof The correlation coecient between XI and XR can be written as follows:
Corr[XI ; XR] =
Cov[XI ; XR]p
Var(XI)
p
Var(XR)
;
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where
Var[XI] = ((x1 ^ R)2p1 + (x2 ^ R)2p2)   ((x1 ^ R)p1 + (x2 ^ R)p2)2
and
Var[XR] = ((x1   R)2+p1 + (x2   R)2+p2)   ((x1   R)+p1 + (x2   R)+p2)2:
Next, we rewrite Corr[XI ; XR] for R  x1, x1 < R  x2, and R > x2. When R  x1, we obtain
Var[XI] = R2p1 + R2p2   (Rp1 + Rp2)2
= R(Rp1 + Rp2)(1   p1   p2):
Since p1+ p2 = 1, we have that the variance Var[XI] = 0. Therefore, the correlation coecient
between XI and XR is undefined. When x1 < R  x2, we obtain
Var[XI] = x21p1 + R
2p2   (x1p1 + Rp2)2
= p1p2(x1   R)2
and
Var[XR] = (x2   R)2p2   [(x2   R)p2]2
= p1p2(x2   R)2:
Then the correlation coecient becomes
Corr[XI; XR] =
(Rp1   x1p1)(x2   R)p2p
p1p2(x1   R)2
p
p1p2(x2   R)2
= 1:
When R > x2, we have (x1   R)+ = 0 and (x2   R)+ = 0. Consequently,
Var[XR] = 0:
Therefore, the correlation coecient between XI and XR is undefined. This completes the proof
of Theorem 3.2.4. 
26 Chapter 3. The variance reduction approach
From this example, and the same conclusion actually holds if the binary distribution in (3.3)
is replaced by any distribution that has any finite number of points, we note that the optimal
retention R1 that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR] can be obtained. However, no optimal retention is ob-
tained when we maximize Corr[XI; XR] with respect to the retention. Therefore, we conclude
that maximizing the correlation coecient is not a suitable criterion for finding an optimal
reinsurance policy.
3.3 Covariancemaximization in the presence of insurer, rein-
surer, and a third party
We now construct an optimal reinsurance policy by maximizingCov[XI ; XR] and/orCov[XR; XG].
We assume that X follows a two-parameter Pareto distribution. Furthermore, we assume that
the deductible d of the insurance policy issued by the insurer is fixed and known. The rest of
this section is organized as follows:
 In Subsection 5.4.2, we discuss some properties of a two-parameter Pareto distribution.
 In Subsection 3.3.2, we obtain the optimal retention R that maximizesCov[XI; XR] when
the policy limit L is fixed and the retention R is still to be determined.
 In Subsection 3.3.3, we find the optimal policy limit L that maximizes Cov[XR; XG]
when R is fixed and L is still to be determined.
 In Subsection 3.3.4, we find the optimal retention and the optimal policy limit when both
R and L are still to be determined.
3.3.1 Two-parameter Pareto distribution
The probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a
two-parameter Pareto random variable with parameters  > 1 and  > 0 are given by
fX(x) =

(x + )+1
(3.6)
and
FX(x) = 1  


x + 

; (3.7)
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respectively. The Pareto distribution is a heavy-tailed distribution.
Definition 3.3.1 (cf., e.g., Asmussen, 2003) Heavy-tailed distributions are probability distri-
butions whose tails are not exponentially bounded, that is, they have heavier tails than the
exponential distribution. In many applications it is the right tail of the distribution that is of in-
terest, but a distribution may have a heavy left tail, or both tails may be heavy. The distribution
of a random variable Y with cumulative distribution function F is said to have a heavy right tail
if
lim
y!1 e
yP[Y > y] = 1 for all  > 0:
3.3.2 Finding the retention
In the next theorem, we find an optimal retention when the policy limit is already determined.
Theorem 3.3.2 Suppose X follows a two-parameter Pareto distribution with parameters  > 1
and  > 0. Let the deductible d > 0 of the insurance policy issued by the insurer be fixed.
Furthermore, let the policy limit L > 0 of the reinsurance contract be fixed. Then the optimal
retention R of the reinsurance contract that maximizes the covariance of XI and XR must satisfy
the following two properties:
 (L + )1    2 (R + )  (L + )1     (R + )1  + 2 2 (R + ) 2+1
  R (R + )  + R (R + )   + d (R + )    d (R + )  
  2 (R + )  (d + )1  = 0 (3.8)
and
2(d + ) 1(R + ) 1   2(1   )(d + ) 1(R + )(L + ) 1
+ 2(1   2)2(d + ) 1(L + ) 1 + ((R   d)(1   )(d + ) 1
+ 2)(R + ) 1(L + ) 1 < 0: (3.9)
Proof Given the distribution of X, by dierentiating Cov[XI; XR] with respect to R, we obtain
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@
@R
Cov[XI ; XR] =

1   (L + )
 +1   
2
1   (R + )
 (L + ) +1   

1    (R + )
 +1
+
2
1   (R + )
 2+1   (R   d)


R + 

+
2
1   (R + )
 2+1
  
2
1   (R + )
 (d + ) +1: (3.10)
Next, we set
@
@R
Cov[XI ; XR] = 0;
and then solve for R. Using the “solve” feature of Maple, the solution, which we denote by R˜,
must satisfy
(L + )1    2(R˜ + ) (L + )1    (R˜ + )1  + 2 2(R˜ + ) 2+1   R˜(R˜ + ) 
+ R˜(R˜ + )  + d(R˜ + )    d(R˜ + )    2(R˜ + ) (d + )1  = 0;
which is the first condition that the optimal retention must satisfy, reported as equation (3.8)
above. The critical point R˜ maximizes Cov[XI; XR] if

@
@R
2
Cov[XI ; XR]

R=R˜
< 0: (3.11)
The second derivative of Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to R is given by

@
@R
2
Cov[XI; XR] =
2
(1   )(L + ) 1(R + )+1  
2
(R + )
+ 2(1   2) 
2
(1   )(R + )2
+
(R   d)(1   )(d + ) 1 + 2
(1   )(d + ) 1(R + )+1 :
Condition (3.11) is satisfied if
2(d + ) 1(R˜ + ) 1   2(1   )(d + ) 1(R˜ + )(L + ) 1
+ 2(1   2)2(d + ) 1(L + ) 1 + ((R˜   d)(1   )(d + ) 1
+ 2)(R˜ + ) 1(L + ) 1 < 0;
which is the second condition that the optimal retention must satisfy, and it is given in (3.9).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.2. 
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To illustrate graphically, in Figure 3.2, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when  = 3,  = 100,
d = 100, and L = 1000. Note that Cov[XI ; XR] is maximized when R = 269:4882275.
Figure 3.2: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when L is fixed and known.
3.3.3 Finding the policy limit
In the next theorem, we find an optimal policy limit when the retention is already determined.
Theorem 3.3.3 Suppose X follows the two-parameter Pareto distribution with parameters
 > 1 and  > 0. Let the deductible d > 0 of the insurance policy issued by the insurer
be fixed. Furthermore, let the retention R > 0 of the reinsurance contract be fixed. Then the
optimal policy limit L of the reinsurance contract that maximizes Cov[XR; XG] must satisfy the
following two properties:
   (L + )1  + 2 2 (L + ) 2+1   L (L + )  + L (L + )   + R (L + ) 
  R (L + )     2 (L + )  (R + )1  = 0 (3.12)
and
(   1)(R + ) 1(L + ) + 22(1   2)(R + ) 1   (1   )(R + ) 1(L + )
+ (L   R)(1   )(R + ) 1(L + ) 1 + (L + ) 1 < 0: (3.13)
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Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3.2, given the distribution of X, we first find the
critical point(s) of Cov[XR; XG] by dierentiating Cov[XR; XG] with respect to L. We have the
equation
@
@L
Cov[XR; XG] =   

(1   )(L + ) 1 +
2
(1   )(L + )2 1   L


L + 

+
2
1    (L + )
 2+1
+ R


L + 

  
1   (R + )
 +1(L + ) :
(3.14)
Next, we set
@
@L
Cov[XR; XG] = 0;
and solve for L. Using the “solve” feature of Maple, the solution, which we denote by L˜, must
satisfy
  (L˜ + )1  + 2 2(L˜ + ) 2+1   L˜(L˜ + )  + L˜(L˜ + )  + R(L˜ + ) 
  R(L˜ + )    2(L˜ + ) (R + )1  = 0;
which is the first condition the optimal policy limit must satisfy, and it is reported as equation
(3.12). The critical point L˜ maximizes Cov[XR; XG] if

@
@L
2
Cov[XR; XG]

L=L˜
< 0: (3.15)
The second derivative of Cov[XR; XG] with respect to L is given by

@
@L
2
Cov[XR; XG] =   

(L + )
+
22(1   2)
(1   )(L + )2  

(L + )
+
(L   R)
(L + )+1
+

(1   )(R + ) 1(L + )+1 :
Condition (3.15) is satisfied if
(   1)(R + ) 1(L˜ + ) + 22(1   2)(R + ) 1   (1   )(R + ) 1(L˜ + )
+ (L˜   R)(1   )(R + ) 1(L˜ + ) 1 + (L˜ + ) 1 < 0;
which is the second condition that the optimal policy limit must satisfy, and it is given in (3.13).
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This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.3. 
To illustrate graphically, in Figure 3.3, we plot L versus Cov[XR; XG] when  = 3,  = 100,
d = 100, and R = 900. Note that Cov[XR; XG] is maximized when L = 1900:500.
Figure 3.3: Policy limit L versus Cov[XR; XG] when R is fixed and known.
3.3.4 Finding the retention and the policy limit
When both R and L are still negotiable, we plot Cov[XI; XR] as a function of R and L in Figure
3.4, and Cov[XR; XG] as a function of R and L in Figure 3.5. We assume  = 3,  = 100,
and d = 100. We note that it is dicult to obtain closed-form expressions for R and L that
maximize both Cov[XI ; XR] and Cov[XR; XG]. Hence, we shall use a decision-theory based
approach, which looks particularly attractive from the practical point of view.
Recall from Theorem 3.3.2 that every time we change the value of L, a new optimal reten-
tion R that maximizes Cov[XI; XR] is obtained. In Figure 3.6, we plot L versus R, where R
satisfies the two conditions for the optimal retention given in (3.8) and (3.9). Similarly, from
Theorem 3.3.3, each time we change the value of R, a new optimal policy limit L that maxi-
mizes Cov[XR; XG] is obtained. In Figure 3.7, we plot R versus L, where L satisfies the two
conditions for the optimal policy limit given in (3.12) and (3.13). Note that in Figure 3.6, the
optimal retention R converges to 313:29 when L becomes large. However, in Figure 3.7, the
optimal policy limit L is 729:53 when R = 313:29, which is considerably less than the value
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Figure 3.4: The covariance of XI and XR as a function of R and L.
Figure 3.5: The covariance of XR and XG as a function of R and L.
of L corresponding to R = 313:29 in Figure 3.6. Next, we consider a negotiation process that
helps the insurer and the reinsurer reach an agreement on R and L.
We begin the first round of negotiations by maximizing Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to R. At
this stage, we assume that the undecided policy limit is very large. The solution, which we
denote by R, is 313:29 since we know from Figure 3.6 that the optimal retention converges
to this value when the policy limit becomes large. The reinsurer then communicates with
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Figure 3.6: Policy limit L versus retention R.
Figure 3.7: Retention R versus policy limit L.
the third party given the retention. By maximizing Cov[XR; XG] with respect to L given that
R = 313:29, we obtain the solution L, which is equal to 729:53. This concludes the first round
of negotiations. Next, the reinsurer provides the information about the new policy limit to the
insurer and another round of negotiations begins between the insurer and the reinsurer. We
maximize Cov[XI; XR] with respect to R given that the policy limit is L = 729:53. Then the
new optimal retention is R = 248:48. Next, the reinsurer communicates with the third party to
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obtain a new optimal policy limit L that maximizes Cov[XR; XG] when R = 248:48. The new
optimal policy limit is 601:133. This concludes the second round of negotiations. At the end
of each round, we obtain a new pair of R and L. An agreement is reached when R and L
both converge to a number. In Table 3.1, we present R and L for the first thirteen rounds of
negotiations. Note that in the end, we obtain R = 227:885 and L = 560:486.
R L
313:291 729:530
248:483 601:133
233:562 571:678
229:500 563:671
228:348 561:400
228:018 560:749
227:923 560:562
227:896 560:508
227:888 560:492
227:886 560:488
227:885 560:487
227:885 560:486
227:885 560:486
Table 3.1: Optimal R and L in the first thirteen rounds of negotiations when  = 3,  = 100,
and d = 100.
3.4 Covariance maximization: multiple policy claims
We have obtained an optimal reinsurance policy using the variance reduction approach under
facultative reinsurance. What happens when we assume the method of treaty reinsurance?
Consider the following problem: During a given time period, the insurer issues a number
of insurance policies. Let N be the number of insurance policies issued that require a claim
payment from the insurer in the given time period. Furthermore, let the claim sizes, say X1,
X2, : : : , be i.i.d. random variables, with each Xi having the same distribution as X. Each
claim size Xi is also independent of time. The insurer then purchases a reinsurance contract
that ensures reinsurance coverage for all insurance policies the insurer had issued. For each
insurance policy included in the reinsurance contract, the reinsurer covers the claim amount
exceeding R when a claim payment needs to be made. Then the insurer’s share of all claims is
given by
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XI =
NX
i=1
(Xi ^ R);
and the reinsurer’s share of all claims is given by
XR =
NX
i=1
(Xi   R)+:
The rest of this section is organized as follows:
 In Subsection 3.4.1, we present an expression for Cov[XI ; XR].
 In Subsection 3.4.2, we compare the critical points of Cov[XI ; XR] and Cov[(X^R); (X 
R)+]. Note that the latter covariance arises when only one insurance policy requires a
claim payment during the given time period.
 In Subsection 3.4.3, we use four illustrative examples to show how the optimal retention
R is aected by parameter values of the distribution of N.
3.4.1 Covariance between the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s shares of the
claims
Here we derive an expression for Cov[XI ; XR].
Theorem 3.4.1 Suppose that N follows a discrete distribution. Furthermore, assume that the
random variables X1, X2, : : : are i.i.d. Finally, under treaty reinsurance in the excess of loss
form, let the retention be R > 0. Then the covariance between XI and XR is given by
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[N]RE[(X   R)+] + Var[N]E[X ^ R]E[(X   R)+]
  E[N]E[X ^ R]E[(X   R)+]: (3.16)
Proof The covariance between XI and XR can be written as follows:
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[XIXR]   E[XI]E[XR]: (3.17)
We next calculate the three expectations on the right-hand side of equation (3.17). We begin
with the expectation of the product XIXR. To calculate the expectation, we consider the law of
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iterated expectations.
Definition 3.4.2 (cf., e.g., Weiss et al., 2006) The law of iterated expectations states that if X
is an integrable random variable and Y is any random variable, not necessarily integrable, on
the same probability space, then E[X] = E[E[X j Y]].
Using the law of iterated expectations, we have
E[XIXR] = E

E
X
i= j
(Xi1fXi  Rg + R1fXi > Rg)(X j   R)1fX j > Rg
+
X
i, j
(Xi1fXi  Rg + R1fXi > Rg)(X j   R)1fX j > Rg j N

= E[E[NR(X   R)1fX > Rg]] + E[N(N   1)E[X1fX  Rg + R1fX > Rg]
 E[(X   R)1fX > Rg]]
= E[N]RE[(X   R)+] + E[N2   N]E[X ^ R]E[(X   R)+]: (3.18)
Similarly, the other two expectations on the right-hand side of equation (3.17) become
E[XI] = E

E
 NX
i=1
(Xi1fXi  Rg + R1fXi > Rg) j N

= E[N]
 Z R
0
xdFX(x) + R(1   FX(R))

= E[N]E[X ^ R] (3.19)
and
E[XR] = E

E
 NX
i=1
(Xi   R)1fX > Rg j N

= E[N]
 Z 1
R
xdFX(x)   R
Z 1
R
dFX(x)

= E[N]E[(X   R)+]: (3.20)
Having thus calculated the three expectations with formulas given in equations (3.18), (3.19),
and (3.20), we obtain an expression for the covariance, which is given in equation (3.16). This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.1. 
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3.4.2 Comparison of critical points
We now compare the critical points of Cov[XI ; XR] and Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+]. Since the
critical point(s) must include the value of the optimal retention, this may show how the optimal
retention is aected by N. Let us first find the critical point(s) of Cov[XI ; XR].
Theorem 3.4.3 Assume that conditions of Theorem 3.4.1 are satisfied. Furthermore, assume
that the distribution function of X is twice dierentiable. Then the value R˜1 that satisfies the
equation
E[N]E[X1fX > R˜1g] = 2R˜1E[N](1   FX(R˜1))   (Var[N]   E[N])((1   FX(R˜1)))
 (E[(X   R˜1)+]   E[X ^ R˜1]) (3.21)
is a critical point of Cov[XI ; XR]. Moreover, the critical point R˜1 maximizes Cov[XI; XR] if the
following condition is satisfied
E[N](R˜1 fX(R˜1)   2(1   FX(R˜1))) + (Var[N]   E[N])( fX(R˜1)
 (E[X ^ R˜1]   E[(X   R˜1)+])   2(1   FX(R˜1))2) < 0: (3.22)
Proof To find the critical point(s), we dierentiate Cov[XI ; XR] with respect to R and get:
@
@R
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[N]
Z 1
R
x fX(x)dx   2RE[N](1   FX(R))
+ (Var[N]   E[N])(1   FX(R))
 (E[(X   R)+]   E[X ^ R])
= E[N]E[X1fX > Rg]   2RE[N](1   FX(R))
+ (Var[N]   E[N])(1   FX(R))(E[(X   R)+]   E[X ^ R]): (3.23)
Next, we set the right-hand side of equation (3.23) to 0 and solve for R. The solution, which
we denote by R˜1, satisfies equation (3.21). The critical point R˜1 maximizes Cov[XI; XR] if

@
@R
2
Cov[XI ; XR]

R=R˜1
< 0:
The second derivative can be written as follows:
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
@
@R
2
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[N](R fX(R)   2(1   FX(R)))
+ ( fX(R)(E[X ^ R]   E[(X   R)+])   2(1   FX(R))2)
 (Var[N]   E[N]):
The critical point R˜1 that maximizes Cov[XI; XR] should satisfy the property
E[N](R˜1 fX(R˜1)   2(1   FX(R˜1))) + (Var[N]   E[N])( fX(R˜1)
 (E[X ^ R˜1]   E[(X   R˜1)+])   2(1   FX(R˜1))2) < 0;
which is condition (3.22). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.3. 
Next, we obtain the critical point(s) of Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+].
Theorem 3.4.4 Suppose that under treaty reinsurance, a claim payment is required for only
one insurance policy during the given time period. Furthermore, let the distribution function
of X be dierentiable. Finally, let the reinsurer cover the amount exceeding R > 0. Then the
value R˜2 is a critical point of Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+] ifZ 1
R˜2
x fX(x)dx   2R˜2(1   FX(R˜2))   (1   FX(R˜2))(E[(X   R˜2)+]   E[X ^ R˜2]) = 0: (3.24)
Proof We can write the covariance as follows:
Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+] = E[(X ^ R)(X   R)+]   E[X ^ R]E[(X   R)+]
= RE[(X   R)+]   E[X ^ R]E[(X   R)+]: (3.25)
To obtain the critical point(s) of Cov[(X^R); (X R)+], we dierentiate Cov[(X^R); (X R)+]
with respect to R and get
@
@R
Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+] =
Z 1
R
x fX(x)dx   2R(1   FX(R))   (1   FX(R))
 (E[(X   R)+]   E[X ^ R]): (3.26)
We then set
@
@R
Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+] = 0;
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and solve for R. The solution, which we denote by R˜2, must satisfy the condition for the critical
point(s) given by equation (3.24). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.4. 
Comparing results from Theorems 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, we note that when Var[N] = 0, then the
critical points of Cov[
PN
i=1(Xi ^ R);
PN
i=1(Xi   R)+] and Cov[(X ^ R); (X   R)+] are the same,
that is, equation (3.21) becomes equation (3.24). Next, we provide examples that show how
the optimal retention is aected by E[N] and Var[N].
3.4.3 Illustrative examples
We use four examples to demonstrate how the optimal retention R is aected by the parameter
values of the distribution of N. In each example, we first obtain optimal retentions when E[N]
is fixed and Var[N] changes. Next, we find optimal retentions when Var[N] is fixed and E[N]
changes. The distributions of the random variables Xi and N used in each example are as
follows:
 In Example 3.4.5, the random variable N follows a binomial distribution and each claim
size Xi follows an exponential distribution.
 In Example 3.4.6, the random variable N follows a negative binomial distribution and
each claim size Xi follows an exponential distribution.
 In Example 3.4.7, the random variable N follows a binomial distribution and each claim
size Xi follows a two-parameter Pareto distribution.
 In Example 3.4.8, the random variable N follows a negative binomial distribution and
each claim size Xi follows a two-parameter Pareto distribution.
Recall that when N follows the binomial distribution with parameters n = 1; 2; : : : and 0  p 
1, then the PDF of N is given by
P[N = k] =
 
n
k
!
pk(1   p)n k
for k = 0; 1; : : : ; n. When N follows the negative binomial distribution with parameters r > 0
and  > 0, then the PDF of N is given by
P[N = k] =
 
k + r   1
k
! 1
1 + 
k 
1 + 
r
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for k = 0; 1; : : : : When X follows the exponential distribution with parameter  > 0, then the
PDF of X is given by
fX(x) =
1

e x=; x > 0:
We let N follow either the binomial distribution or the negative binomial distribution, because
both distributions are commonly used to model the occurrence of events during the considered
period of time. We do not consider the Poisson distribution here, because the mean and the
variance of it are the same.
Example 3.4.5 Let N follow the binomial distribution with parameters n > 0 and 0  p  1.
Furthermore, let each claim size Xi follow the exponential distribution with parameter  = 10.
Under these conditions, we find the optimal retention R that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR] for each
pair (n, p). Results are given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In detail, given the specified distributions
of N and Xi, we have the formula
Cov[XI ; XR] = npRe R= + np(1   p)2(1   e R=)e R=   np2(1   e R=)e R=:
From Table 3.2, we note that, for each pair (n, p), the mean E[N] is fixed, that is,
n p
2 1=2
3 1=3
4 1=4
5 1=5
6 1=6
7 1=7
8 1=8
Table 3.2: Values of n and p such that E[N] is fixed and Var[N] varies.
n p
2 12
3 12   16
p
3
4 12   14
p
2
5 12   110
p
15
6 12   16
p
6
7 12   114
p
35
8 12   14
p
3
Table 3.3: Values of n and p such that Var[N] is fixed and E[N] varies.
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E[N] = 1;
but the variance Var[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of
Theorem 3.4.3, which are given by (3.21) and (3.22), is obtained for each value of Var[N].
Results are provided in Table 3.4. To show graphically how R is aected by Var[N], in Figure
3.8, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when Var[N] = 1=2; 2=3; and 3=4; and E[N] = 1. Note that
E[N] Var[N] R
1 1=2 11:983
1 2=3 11:146
1 3=4 10:802
1 4=5 10:616
1 5=6 10:500
1 6=7 10:421
1 7=8 10:363
Table 3.4: Optimal retention R when E[N] is fixed, N is binomial, and X is exponential.
Figure 3.8: Retention R versusCov[XI ; XR] forVar[N] = 1=2 (solid curve), 2=3 (dashed curve),
and 3=4 (dotted curve).
for fixed E[N], the optimal retention R decreases when the variance Var[N] increases.
Next, from Table 3.3, we see that, for each pair (n, p),
Var[N] =
1
2
;
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but E[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions in Theorem 3.4.3 is
obtained for each value of E[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.5. To show graphically how
R is aected by E[N], in Figure 3.9, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when the mean E[N] =
1; (3=2)   (1=2)p3; and 2   p2, and the variance Var[N] = 1=2. Note that for fixed Var[N],
E[N] Var[N] R
1 1=2 11:983
3
2   12
p
3 1=2 10:657
2   p2 1=2 10:432
5
2   12
p
15 1=2 10:324
3   p6 1=2 10:260
7
2   12
p
35 1=2 10:217
4   2p3 1=2 10:186
Table 3.5: Optimal retention R when Var[N] is fixed, N is binomial, and X is exponential.
Figure 3.9: Retention R versusCov[XI; XR] forE[N] = 1 (solid curve), (3=2) (1=2)
p
3 (dashed
curve), and 2   p2 (dotted curve).
the optimal retention R decreases when E[N] decreases. This concludes Example 3.4.5.
Example 3.4.6 Let N follow the negative binomial distribution with parameters r > 0 and
 > 0. Furthermore, let each claim size Xi follow the exponential distribution with parameter
 = 10. Then we find the optimal retention R that maximizes the covariance Cov[XI ; XR]
for each pair (r, ). The results are given in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. In detail, given the specified
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distributions of N and Xi, we have the formula
Cov[XI ; XR] = rRe R= + r(1 + )2(1   e R=)e R=   r2(1   e R=)e R=:
From Table 3.6, note that for each pair (r, ), we have
r 
1 2
2 1
3 2=3
4 1=2
5 2=5
Table 3.6: Values of r and  such that E[N] is fixed and Var[N] varies.
r 
1 2
2   12 + 12
p
13
3 1
4   12 + 12
p
7
5   12 + 110
p
145
Table 3.7: Values of r and  such that Var[N] is fixed and E[N] varies.
E[N] = 2;
but Var[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of Theorem 3.4.3
is obtained for each value of Var[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.8. To show graphically
how R is aected by Var[N], in Figure 3.10, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when the variance
Var[N] = 6; 4; and 10=3; and the mean E[N] = 2. We note the same pattern as in Example
E[N] Var[N] R
2 6 7:990
2 4 8:526
2 10=3 8:841
2 3 9:047
2 14=5 9:191
Table 3.8: Optimal retention R when E[N] is fixed, N is negative binomial, and X is exponen-
tial.
3.4.5, that is, for fixed E[N], the optimal retention R decreases when Var[N] increases.
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Figure 3.10: Retention R versus Cov[XI; XR] for Var[N] = 6 (solid curve), 4 (dashed curve),
and 10=3 (dotted curve).
Next, from Table 3.7, we see that, for each pair (r, ),
Var[N] = 6;
but E[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of Theorem 3.4.3
is obtained for each value of E[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.9. To show graphically
how R is aected by E[N], in Figure 3.11, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when the mean
E[N] = 2; 1 + p13, and 3, and the variance Var[N] = 6. We note that for fixed Var[N], the
optimal retention R increases when E[N] increases. This concludes Example 3.4.6.
E[N] Var[N] R
2 6 7:990
 1 + p13 6 8:316
3 6 8:526
 2 + 2p7 6 8:680
  52 + 12
p
145 6 8:800
Table 3.9: Optimal retention R when Var[N] is fixed, N is negative binomial, and X is expo-
nential.
Example 3.4.7 Let N follow the binomial distribution with parameters n > 0 and 0  p  1.
Furthermore, let each claim size Xi follow the two-parameter Pareto distribution with parame-
ters  = 5 and  = 10. Then we obtain the optimal retention R that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR]
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Figure 3.11: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] for E[N] = 2 (solid curve),  1 +
p
13 (dashed
curve), and 3 (dotted curve).
for each pair (n, p), with results given in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. In detail, given the specified
distributions of N and Xi, we have the formula
Cov[XI; XR] = npR

   1


R + 
 1
+ np(1   p) 
   1


1  


R + 
 1 
   1


R + 
 1
  np 
   1


1  


R + 
 1 
   1


R + 
 1
:
From Table 3.10, we see that for each pair (n, p), we have the fixed mean
n p
2 1=2
3 1=3
4 1=4
5 1=5
6 1=6
7 1=7
8 1=8
Table 3.10: Values of n and p such that E[N] is fixed and Var[N] varies.
E[N] = 1;
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n p
2 12
3 12   16
p
3
4 12   14
p
2
5 12   110
p
15
6 12   16
p
6
7 12   114
p
35
8 12   14
p
3
Table 3.11: Values of n and p such that Var[N] is fixed and E[N] varies.
but the variance Var[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of
Theorem 3.4.3 is obtained for each value of Var[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.12. To
show graphically how R is aected by Var[N], in Figure 3.12, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR]
when the variance Var[N] = 1=2; 2=3, and 3=4, and the mean E[N] = 1.
  E[N] Var[N] R
5 10 1 1=2 7:187
5 10 1 2=3 6:610
5 10 1 3=4 6:327
5 10 1 4=5 6:160
5 10 1 5=6 6:050
5 10 1 6=7 5:972
5 10 1 7=8 5:914
Table 3.12: Optimal retention R when E[N] is fixed, N is binomial, and X is two-parameter
Pareto.
Next, from Table 3.11, we see that, for each pair (n, p), the variance is
Var[N] =
1
2
;
but the mean E[N] changes. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of The-
orem 3.4.3 is obtained for each value of E[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.13. To show
graphically how R is aected by E[N], in Figure 3.13, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when the
mean E[N] = 1; (3=2)   p3=2, and 2   p2, and the variance Var[N] = 1=2. This concludes
Example 3.4.7.
Example 3.4.8 Let N follow the negative binomial distribution with parameters r > 0 and
 > 0. Furthermore, let each claim size Xi follow the two-parameter Pareto distribution with
the parameters  = 3 and  = 10. Then we find the optimal retention R that maximizes
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Figure 3.12: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] for Var[N] = 1=2 (solid curve), 2=3 (dashed
curve), and 3=4 (dotted curve).
  E[N] Var[N] R
5 10 1 1=2 7:187
5 10 32   12
p
3 1=2 6:198
5 10 2   p2 1=2 5:984
5 10 52   12
p
15 1=2 5:874
5 10 3   p6 1=2 5:806
5 10 72   12
p
35 1=2 5:761
5 10 4   2p3 1=2 5:727
Table 3.13: Optimal retention R when Var[N] is fixed, N is binomial, and X is two-parameter
Pareto.
Cov[XI ; XR] for each pair (r, ), with results given in Tables 3.14 and 3.15. In detail, given the
specified distributions of N and Xi, we have the formula
Cov[XI; XR] = rR

   1


R + 
 1
+ r2

   1

1  


R + 
 1 
   1


R + 
 1
:
From Table 3.14, we see that, for each pair (r, ), the mean is
E[N] = 2;
but the variance Var[N] changes. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of
Theorem 3.4.3 is obtained for each value of Var[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.16. To
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Figure 3.13: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] for E[N] = 1 (solid curve), (3=2) 
p
3=2 (dashed
curve), and 2   p2 (dotted curve).
r 
1 2
2 1
3 2=3
4 1=2
5 2=5
Table 3.14: Values of r and  such that E[N] is fixed and Var[N] varies.
r 
1 2
2   12 + 12
p
13
3 1
4   12 + 12
p
7
5   12 + 110
p
145
Table 3.15: Values of r and  such that Var[N] is fixed and E[N] varies.
show graphically how R is aected by Var[N], in Figure 3.14, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR]
when the variance Var[N] = 6; 4, and 10=3, and the mean E[N] = 2.
Next, from Table 3.15, we see that, for each pair (r, ), the variance is
Var[N] = 6;
but the mean E[N] varies. An optimal retention R that satisfies the two conditions of Theorem
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  E[N] Var[N] R
3 10 2 6 5:874
3 10 2 4 6:956
3 10 2 10=3 7:625
3 10 2 3 8:064
3 10 2 14=5 8:370
Table 3.16: Optimal retention R when E[N] is fixed, N is negative binomial, and X is two-
parameter Pareto.
Figure 3.14: Retention R versus Cov[XI; XR] for Var[N] = 6 (solid curve), 4 (dashed curve),
and 10=3 (dotted curve).
3.4.3 is obtained for each value of E[N]. Results are provided in Table 3.17. To show graphi-
cally how R is aected by E[N], in Figure 3.15, we plot R versus Cov[XI ; XR] when the mean
E[N] = 2; 1 + p13, and 3, and the variance Var[N] = 6. We observe the same pattern as in
Examples 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and 3.4.7. This concludes Example 3.4.8.
  E[N] Var[N] R
3 10 2 6 5:874
3 10  1 + p13 6 6:520
3 3 10 6 6:956
3 10  2 + 2p7 6 7:282
3 10   52 + 12
p
145 6 7:537
Table 3.17: Optimal retention R when E[N] is fixed, N is negative binomial, and X is two-
parameter Pareto.
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Figure 3.15: Retention R versus Cov[XI ; XR] for E[N] = 2 (solid curve),  1 +
p
13 (dashed
curve), and 3 (dotted curve).
In summary, we have shown how changing the parameter values of the distribution of N
aects the optimal retention. To obtain the optimal retention, simple assumptions are made, but
they do not always hold true in the real world. Therefore, the patterns that we have observed
in these examples will not always hold true either. Nevertheless, they are instructive.
Chapter 4
Claim sizes depend on time
In this chapter, we obtain an optimal reinsurance policy when claim sizes are dependent on
preceding inter-claim times.
During the time interval (0; t], let N(t) be the number of insurance policies that require a
claim payment from the insurer up to and including the time t. Furthermore, let T1;T2; : : : be
the claim arrival times, and let X1; X2; : : : be the corresponding claim sizes. Then the insurer’s
aggregate claim size without the reinsurance coverage up to and including the time t is
PN(t)
i=1 Xi,
where 0 < T1 < T2 <    < TN(t)  t, and PN(t)i=1 Xi = 0 when N(t) = 0. When the policies are
reinsured, the insurer’s share of the claims is given by
XI =
N(t)X
i=1
(Xi ^ R);
and the reinsurer’s share of the claims is given by
XR =
N(t)X
i=1
(Xi   R)+:
Next, let Vi be the ith inter-claim time, which is given by
Vi = Ti   Ti 1 for i  1; and T0 = 0:
We assume that each claim size Xi depends on the inter-claim time Vi. The rest of this chapter
is organized as follows:
 In Section 4.1, we define the order statistic point process and review studies in the liter-
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ature related to modelling claim sizes that depend on time.
 In Section 4.2, we present an expression for Cov[XI ; XR].
 In Section 4.3, we present the steps for deriving Cov[XI; XR].
 In Section 4.4, we illustrate how to find the optimal retention R that maximizes the
covariance Cov[XI ; XR].
4.1 Order statistic point process
Since each claim size Xi depends on the inter-claim time Vi, we must understand the claim
arrival process, which is a general point process. An order statistic point process is useful for
this purpose.
Definition 4.1.1 (cf., e.g., Debrabant, 2008) A point process N(t) is an order statistic point
process if, provided P[N(t) = n] > 0 with t > 0 and n  0, the arrival times of the claims
T1;T2; : : : ; Tn conditioned upon N(t) = n, are distributed like the order statistics of n i.i.d.
random variables with a common distribution function Ft(x), for x > 0, such that Ft(t) = 1.
For more on the properties of order statistic point processes, we refer to Neuts and Resnick
(1971), Crump (1975), Berg (1981), Puri (1982), and Huang and Shoung (1994). A simple
example of order statistics point processes is the homogeneous Poisson process with rate pa-
rameter  > 0, whose definition we recall next.
Definition 4.1.2 (cf., e.g., Focardi and Fabozzi, 2004) A homogeneous Poisson process is
defined as a process N(t) that starts at zero and has independent stationary increments. In
addition, the random variable N(t) is distributed as a Poisson variable with parameter t, where
N(t) is a time dependent discrete variable that can assume nonnegative integer values. In this
case, the distribution function Ft that we mentioned in Definition 4.1.1 is given by
Ft(x) =
x
t
for 0  x  t;
which is the uniform distribution on [0; t].
We will use the homogeneous Poisson process as the point process for our model. In more
complicated cases, a non-homogeneous Poisson process with rate parameter (t) is assumed,
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when during the time interval (0; t], the mean is
R t
0
(t)dt. Some examples of past studies
on the topic include the estimation of the intensity function of a cyclic Poisson process (cf.,
e.g., Helmers and Zitikis, 1999; Helmers et al., 2003, 2005; Bebbington and Zitikis, 2004)
and the non-parametric estimation of the doubly periodic Poisson intensity function (cf., e.g.,
Helmers et al., 2007). Other examples of point processes include the Cox point process and
the determinantal point process. For more information, we refer to Cox and Isham (2000).
Various studies on modelling claim sizes that depend on time have been reported in the
literature. For example, by assuming that the subsequent claim size depends on the previous
inter-claim time, Albrecher and Teugels (2006) provide exponential estimates for infinite and
finite time ruin probabilities, and Boudreault et al. (2006) derive an explicit expression for the
Laplace transform of the time to ruin. Sendova and Zitikis (2012) model aggregate insurance
claims when claim sizes depend on the claim arrival times and/or the inter-claim times. For
more examples on modelling claim sizes that depend on the inter-claim times, we refer to
Albrecher and Boxma (2004), Cossette et al. (2008), Asimit and Badescu (2010), and Cheung
et al. (2010).
4.2 Expression for the covariance
To obtain the optimal retention R that maximizes Cov[XI ; XR], we first derive an expression
for the covariance.
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose N(t) follows the homogeneous Poisson process with rate parameter
 > 0. Furthermore, let each claim size Xi depend on the inter-claim time Vi. Finally, let the
conditional variables Xi j Vi = v be i.i.d. Then
Cov[XI ; XR]
=
Z t
0
e v((t v)+1)E[(X1^R)(X1 R)+ j V1 = v]dv+
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)(((t y v)+2)2 2)
E[(X1 ^R) j V1 = v]E[(X1  R)+ j V1 = v]dvdy 
Z t
0
e v((t  v)+ 1)E[(X1 ^R) j V1 = v]dv

Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)E[(X1   R)+ j V1 = v]dv: (4.1)
Corollary 4.2.2 Suppose the conditions of Theorem 4.2.1 hold true. Furthermore, let Fl be the
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CDF of the larger claims, and let Fs be the CDF of the smaller claims. Finally, let the CDF of
the conditional variables Xi j Vi = v be given by (cf., e.g., Boudreault et al., 2006)
P[Xi  x j Vi = v] = (1   e v)Fl(x) + e vFs(x) (4.2)
for every x  0, where   0 and 0  v  t. Then
Cov[XI ; XR] =
Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)R
Z 1
R
(x   R)((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dxdv
+
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)((((t   y   v) + 2)2)   2)

 Z R
0
x((1   e y) fl(x) + e y fs(x))dx +
Z 1
R
R((1   e y) fl(x) + e y fs(x))dx


Z 1
R
(x   R)((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dxdvdy
 
Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)
 Z R
0
x((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dx
+
Z 1
R
R((1   e y) fl(x) + e y fs(x))dx
 Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)

Z 1
R
(x   R)((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dxdv; (4.3)
where fl is the PDF of larger claims and fs is the PDF of smaller claims.
Proof Given the CDF of conditional variables Xi j Vi = v, we write
E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+jV1 = v] =
Z 1
R
R(x   R)((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dx: (4.4)
Similarly, we obtain
E[(X1 ^ R) j V1 = v] =
Z R
0
x((1   e y) fl(x) + e y fs(x))dx
+
Z 1
R
R((1   e y) fl(x) + e y fs(x))dx (4.5)
and
E[(X1   R)+jVi = v] =
Z 1
R
(x   R)((1   e v) fl(x) + e v fs(x))dx: (4.6)
Recall from Theorem 4.2.1 that an expression for the covariance Cov[XI ; XR] is given by equa-
tion (4.1). By substituting equations (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6) into the right-hand side of equation
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(4.1), we obtain a new expression for the covariance, which is given by equation (4.3). This
completes the proof of Corollary 4.2.2. 
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
Here we adopt the approach in Sendova and Zitikis (2012). The covariance of XI and XR can
be written as follows:
Cov[XI ; XR] = E[XIXR]   E[XI]E[XR]: (4.7)
Next, we calculate the expectations of XI and XR (Subsection 4.3.1), and the expectation of
XIXR (Subsection 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Calculating expectations of XI and XR
We begin with the expectation of XI. To calculate the expectation, we shall take three steps:
 In the first step, we assume that each claim Xi depends on claim arrival times Ti 1 and Ti.
 In the second step, we assume that each claim Xi depends on the previous claim arrival
time Ti 1 and Vi, the inter-claim time between the (i   1)th claim and the ith claim.
 In the third step, we assume that each claim Xi depends only on Vi, which is the condition
in our theorem.
Each claim Xi depends on claim arrival times Ti 1 and Ti
Using repeated conditioning, we have
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 nX
i=1
E[Xi ^ R j N(t) = n]

=
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j T1 = y;N(t) = n]dF1jt;n(y)
+
nX
i=2
Z Z
0xyt
E[Xi ^ R j Ti 1 = x;Ti = y;N(t) = n]dFi 1;ijt;n(x; y)

; (4.8)
where, for i  1,
Fijt;n(y) = P[Ti  y j N(t) = n] for 0  y  t;
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and, for 1  i  j,
Fi; jjt;n(x; y) = P[Ti  x;T j  y j N(t) = n] for 0  x  y  t:
Using formulas (2:1:6) and (2:2:1) provided by David and Nagaraja (2003), the density corre-
sponding to F1jt;n(y) is given by
f1jt;n(y) = n ft(y)(1   Ft(y))n 1; (4.9)
and the density corresponding to Fi 1;ijt;n(x; y) is given by
fi 1;ijt;n(x; y) =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)! ft(x) ft(y)F
i 2
t (x)(1   Ft(y))n i: (4.10)
Since N(t) follows the homogeneous Poisson process with rate parameter , we have ft(x) = 1=t
and Ft(x) = x=t, where x 2 [0; t]. Consequently, equation (4.9) becomes
f1jt;n(y) =
n(t   y)n 1
tn
; (4.11)
and equation (4.10) becomes
fi 1;ijt;n(x; y) =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   y)n i
tn
: (4.12)
By substituting equations (4.11) and (4.12) into equation (4.8), we have
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j T1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy +
nX
i=2
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!

Z t
0
Z t
x
E[Xi ^ R j Ti 1 = x;Ti = y] x
i 2(t   y)n i
tn
dydx

: (4.13)
Each claim Xi depends on the previous claim arrival time Ti 1 and Vi
By using the change of variables technique, equation (4.13) becomes
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 57
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j T1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
Z t
0
Z t x
0
E[Xi ^ R j Ti 1 = x;Vi = v]
 x
i 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dvdx

: (4.14)
Each claim Xi depends only on Vi
Since T0 = 0 and V1 = T1   T0, we have
E[X1 ^ R j T1 = y] = E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]
and
E[Xi ^ R j Ti 1 = x;Vi = v] = E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]:
Then equation (4.14) becomes
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
Z t x
0
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v] n!(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dvdx

: (4.15)
Remaining steps for finding the expectation of XI
By changing the order of integration on the right-hand side of equation (4.15), we obtain
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]
Z t v
0
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dxdv

; (4.16)
where
Z t v
0
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dx =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
1
tn
Z t v
0
xi 2

1   x
t   v
n i
(t   v)n idx:
(4.17)
Let x = (t   v)y and dx = (t   v)dy. Then equation (4.17) becomes
58 Chapter 4. Claim sizes depend on time
Z t v
0
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dx =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
1
tn
Z 1
0
(t   v)i 2yi 2(1   y)n i
 (t   v)n i(t   v)dy
=
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
(t   v)n 1
tn
Z 1
0
yi 2(1   y)n idy:
(4.18)
Recall the complete beta function, which is defined as follows:
B(z;w) =
Z 1
0
xz 1(1   x)w 1dx;
where z;w > 0. Also recall the well-known formula for the complete beta function:
B(z;w) =
 (z) (w)
 (z + w)
: (4.19)
Using equation (4.19), we rewrite equation (4.18) as follows:
Z t v
0
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   x   v)n i
tn
dx =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
(t   v)n 1
tn
(i   2)!(n   i)!
(i   1 + n   i + 1   1)!
=
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
(t   v)n 1
tn
(i   2)!(n   i)!
(n   1)!
=
n(t   v)n 1
tn
: (4.20)
By substituting equation (4.20) into equation (4.16), we obtain
E[XI] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 Z t
0
E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv

=
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv

: (4.21)
Since
P[N(t) = n] = e t
(t)n
n!
;
equation (4.21) becomes
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E[XI] =
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!
 nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv

: (4.22)
By rearranging terms on the right-hand side of equation (4.22), we have
E[XI] =
Z t
0
e v
1X
n=1
e (t v)
((t   v))n 1
(n   1)!
nX
i=1
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]dv
=
Z t
0
e v
1X
n=0
e (t v)
n(t   v)n
n!
n+1X
i=1
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v]dv: (4.23)
Since the conditional variables Xi j Vi are i.i.d., we have
E[Xi ^ R j Vi = v] = E[X1 ^ R j V1 = v] for i  1:
Therefore, equation (4.23) becomes
E[XI] =
Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)E[X1 ^ R j V1 = v]dv: (4.24)
Result for the expectation of XR
Similar to the way E[XI] was obtained, we obtain the equation
E[XR] =
Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)E[(X1   R)+ j V1 = v]dv: (4.25)
4.3.2 Finding the expectation of XIXR
We start by decomposing the expectation of XIXR as follows:
E[XIXR] =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]

E
 X
1i= jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n

+ E
 X
1i, jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n

: (4.26)
We first obtain expressions for the two expectations in the braces on the right-hand side of
equation (4.26). Then we calculate
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]E
 X
1i= jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

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and 1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]E
 X
1i, jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

:
Finding the expectation of
P
1i= jn(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n
To simplify the presentation, denote E[
P
1i= jn(Xi^R)(X j R)+jN(t) = n] by bt. Using repeated
conditioning, for each claim Xi that depends on Ti 1 and Ti, we have
bt =
Z t
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+jT1 = y;N(t) = n]dF1jt;n(y)
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
Z t x
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Ti 1 = x;Ti = y;N(t) = n]dFi 1;ijt;n(x; y)
=
Z t
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+ j T1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
Z t x
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Ti 1 = x;Ti = y] n!(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   y)n i
tn
dydx:
(4.27)
Next, similar to the way an expression for E[XI] was obtained when each claim size Xi depends
only on the inter-claim time Vi, equation (4.27) becomes
bt =
Z t
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+ j V1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]
Z t v
0
n!
(i   2)!(n   i)!
xi 2(t   v   x)n i
tn
dxdv
=
Z t
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+ j V1 = y]n(t   y)
n 1
tn
dy
+
nX
i=2
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv
=
nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv: (4.28)
Finding the expectation of
P
1i, jn(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n when i < j and i > j
We consider two scenarios: i < j and i > j. When i < j, we denote E[
P
1i< jn(Xi ^ R)(X j  
R)+jN(t) = n] by ct. Then
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ct = E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+ j N(t) = n] +
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n]
+
n 1X
i=2
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi+1   R)+ j N(t) = n] +
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
E[(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n]: (4.29)
Next, we calculate each term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29).
Finding the first term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29)
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Ti, the expectation of (X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+jN(t) = n becomes
E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+jN(t) = n] =
Z t
0
Z t
y
E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+ j T1 = y;T2 = x]
 n!
(n   2)!
(t   x)n 2
tn
dxdy:
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Vi, the expectation is
E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+jN(t) = n] =
Z t
0
Z t y
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+jT1 = y;V2 = v]
 n!
(n   2)!
(t   y   v)n 2
tn
dvdy:
When Xi depends only on Vi, the expectation becomes
E[(X1 ^ R)(X2   R)+jN(t) = n] = n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
E[(X1 ^ R)jV1 = y]E[(X2   R)+jV2 = v]
 (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy: (4.30)
Finding the second term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29)
We write
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n]
=
nX
j=3
Z Z Z
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+ j T1 = y; T j 1 = w;T j = z;N(t) = n]dF1; j 1; jjt;n(y;w; z);
where, for 3  j  n,
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F1; j 1; jjt;n(y;w; z) = P[T1  y; T j 1  w; T j  z j N(t) = n]
for 0  y  w  z  t. Using formula (2:2:2) provided by David and Nagaraja (2003), the
density corresponding to F1; j 1; jjt;n is equal to
f1; j 1; jjt;n(y;w; z) =
n!
( j   3)!(n   j)! ft(y) ft(w) ft(z)(Ft(w)   Ft(y))
j 3(1   Ft(z))n  j:
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Ti, we obtain
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n]
=
nX
j=3
Z t
0
Z z
0
Z w
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+ j T1 = y;T j 1 = w;T j = z]
 n!
( j   3)!(n   j)! ft(y) ft(w) ft(z)(Ft(w)   Ft(y))
j 3
 (1   Ft(z))n  jdydwdz
=
nX
j=3
Z t
0
Z z
0
Z w
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+ j T1 = y;T j 1 = w;T j = z]
 n!
( j   3)!(n   j)!
(w   y) j 3(t   z)n  j
tn
dydwdz:
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Vi, we have
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n]
=
nX
j=3
Z t
0
Z t
y
Z t w
0
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jT1 = y;T j 1 = w;V j = v]
 n!
( j   3)!(n   j)!
(w   y) j 3(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dvdwdy:
When Xi depends only on Vi, we obtain
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n] =
nX
j=3
n!
( j   3)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t
y
Z t w
0
(w   y) j 3(t   w   v)n  j
tn
 E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]E[(X j   R)+ j V j = v]dvdwdy:
(4.31)
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Interchanging the order of integration on the right-hand side of equation (4.31), we have
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n] =
nX
j=3
n!
( j   3)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t y
0
Z t v
y
E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]
 E[(X j   R)+ j V j = v](w   y)
j 3(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dwdvdy;
(4.32)
where
Z t v
y
(w   y) j 3(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dw =
1
tn
Z t v
y
(w   y) j 3
 t   w   v
t   y   v
n  j
(t   y   v)n  jdw: (4.33)
Let w = z(t   y   v) + y and dw = (t   y   v)dz. Then equation (4.33) becomes
Z t v
y
(w   y) j 3(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dw =
1
tn
Z 1
0
z j 3(1   z)n  j(t   y   v) j 3(t   y   v)n  j
 (t   y   v)dz
=
(t   y   v)n 2
tn
Z 1
0
z j 3(1   z)n  jdz: (4.34)
Using the formula for the complete beta function, which is given by equation (4.19), we have
Z 1
0
z j 3(1   z)n  jdz = ( j   3)!(n   j)!
(n   2)! :
Hence, equation (4.34) becomes
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n] = (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
( j   3)!(n   j)!
(n   2)! : (4.35)
By substituting equation (4.35) into equation (4.32), we obtain
nX
j=3
E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n]
=
nX
j=3
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
E[(X1 ^ R)jV1 = y]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v] (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy: (4.36)
Finding the third term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29)
Denote
Pn 1
i=2 E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi+1   R)+jN(t) = n] by dt. When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Ti, we have
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dt =
n 1X
i=2
Z Z Z
E[(Xi^R)(Xi+1 R)+ j Ti 1 = y;Ti = w;Ti+1 = z]dFi 1;i;i+1jt;n(y;w; z); (4.37)
where, for 2  i  n,
Fi 1;i;i+1jt;n(y;w; z) = P[Ti 1  y;Ti  w;Ti+1  z j N(t) = n]
for 0  y  w  z  t. Using formula (2:2:2) from David and Nagaraja (2003), the density
corresponding to Fi 1;i;i+1jt;n is equal to
fi 1;i;i+1jt;n(y;w; z) =
n!
(i   2)!(n   i   1)! ft(y) ft(w) ft(z)Ft(y)
i 2(1   Ft(z))n i 1: (4.38)
Hence, equation (4.37) becomes
dt =
n 1X
i=2
Z t
0
Z z
0
Z w
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi+1   R)+ j Ti 1 = y;Ti = w;Ti+1 = z]
 n!
(i   2)!(n   i   1)!
yi 2(t   z)n i 1
tn
dydwdz: (4.39)
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Vi, equation (4.39) is
dt =
n 1X
i=2
Z t
0
Z t y
0
Z t y u
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi+1   R)+jTi 1 = y;Vi = u;Vi+1 = v]
 n!
(i   2)!(n   i   1)!
yi 2(t   y   u   v)n i 1
tn
dvdudy: (4.40)
When Xi depends only on Vi, similar to the way
Pn
j=3 E[(X1 ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n] was
obtained, equation (4.40) becomes
dt =
n 1X
i=2
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = u]E[(Xi+1   R)+ j Vi+1 = v] (t   u   v)
n 2
tn
dvdu:
(4.41)
Finding the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29)
Denote
Pn 2
i=2
Pn
j=i+2 E[(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+jN(t) = n] by et. When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Ti, we
have
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et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
 Z Z Z Z
E1dFi 1;i; j 1; jjt;n(x; y;w; z)

;
where
E1 = E[(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j Ti 1 = x;Ti = y; T j 1 = w;T j = z]
and
Fi 1;i; j 1; jjt;n(x; y;w; z) = P[Ti 1  x;Ti  y;T j 1  w; T j  z j N(t) = n]
for 2  i < j  n, j   i  2, and 0  x  y  w  z  t. Using formula (2:2:2) from David and
Nagaraja (2003), the density corresponding to Fi 1;i; j 1; jjt;n is equal to
fi 1;i; j 1; jjt;n(x; y;w; z)
=
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)! ft(x) ft(y) ft(w) ft(z)F
i 2
t (x)(Ft(w)   Ft(y)) j i 2(1   Ft(z))n  j:
(4.42)
Consequently,
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
Z t
0
Z z
0
Z w
0
Z y
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j Ti 1 = x; Ti = y;T j 1 = w;T j = z]
 n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!
xi 2(w   y) j i 2(t   z)n  j
tn
dxdydwdz: (4.43)
When Xi depends on Ti 1 and Vi, equation (4.43) becomes
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!

Z t
0
Z t x
0
Z t
x+u
Z t w
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+jTi 1 = x;Vi = u;T j 1 = w;V j = v]
 x
i 2(w   x   u) j i 2(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dvdwdudx: (4.44)
When Xi depends only on Vi, equation (4.44) becomes
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t x
0
Z t
x+u
Z t w
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]
 E[(X j   R)+jV j = v] x
i 2(w   x   u) j i 2(t   w   v)n  j
tn
dvdwdudx: (4.45)
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Let w = w   x   u. Then equation (4.45) becomes
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t x
0
Z t x u
0
Z t x u w
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]
 E[(X j   R)+jV j = v] x
i 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dxdwdvdu: (4.46)
Rearranging terms on the right-hand side of equation (4.46), we have
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]

Z t u v
0
Z t u v w
0
xi 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dxdwdvdu; (4.47)
where
Z t u v w
0
xi 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dx =
w j i 2
tn
Z t u v w
0
xi 2
 t   u   v   w   x
t   u   v   w
n  j
 (t   u   v   w)n  jdx: (4.48)
Let x = (t   u   v   w)y and dx = (t   u   v   w)dy. Then equation (4.48) becomes
Z t u v w
0
xi 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dx =
w j i 2
tn
Z 1
0
yi 2(1   y)n  j(t   u   v   w)i 2
 (t   u   v   w)n  j(t   u   v   w)dy:
Consequently,
Z t u v w
0
xi 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dx =
w j i 2
tn
(t   u   v   w)n  j+i 1

Z 1
0
yi 2(1   y)n  jdy: (4.49)
Using the formula for the complete beta function, which is given in equation (4.19), we have
Z 1
0
yi 2(1   y)n  jdy = (i   2)!(n   j)!
(n   j + i   1)! :
Then equation (4.49) becomes
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Z t u v w
0
xi 2w j i 2(t   x   u   v   w)n  j
tn
dx =
w j i 2
tn
(t   u   v   w)n  j+i 1
 (i   2)!(n   j)!
(n   j + i   1)! : (4.50)
By substituting equation (4.50) into equation (4.47), we have
et =
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n!
(i   2)!( j   i   2)!(n   j)!
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]

Z t u v
0
w j i 2(t   u   v   w)n  j+i 1
tn
dwdvdu
=
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = u]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v](t   u   v)
n 2
tn
dvdu;
(4.51)
where
Z t u v
0
w j i 2(t   u   v   w)n  j+i 1
tn
dw =
(t   u   v)n 2
tn
( j   i   2)!(n   j + i   1)!
(n   2)! : (4.52)
Equation (4.52) is obtained using the formula for the complete beta function, which is similar
to the way equation (4.50) was obtained.
Expression for the expectation of
P
1i< jn(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n
Having calculated each term on the right-hand side of equation (4.29), the expectation ofP
1i< jn(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n, which we denoted by c(t), becomes
ct = n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
E[(X1 ^ R)jV1 = y]E[(X2   R)+jV2 = v] (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy
+
nX
j=3
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
E[(X1 ^ R)jV1 = y]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v](t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy
+
n 1X
i=2
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]E[(Xi+1   R)+jVi+1 = v] (t   u   v)
n 2
tn
dvdu
+
n 2X
i=2
nX
j=i+2
n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t u
0
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = u]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v](t   u   v)
n 2
tn
dvdu
= n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
X
1i< jn
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = y]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v] (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy: (4.53)
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Expression for the expectation of
P
1 j<in(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n
Similarly to the way ct was calculated, the expectation of
P
1 j<in(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n
becomes
E
 X
1 j<in
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

= n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t v
0
X
1 j<in
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = v]
 E[(X j   R)+ j V j = y] (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dydv: (4.54)
Remaining steps for finding the expectation of XIXR
Next, we calculate the sums
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]E
 X
1i= jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

and 1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]E
 X
1i, jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

;
which we denote by gt and ht, respectively.
Calculation of the sum gt
We have calculated the expectation in the sum gt, which is provided in equation (4.28). The
expectation is given by
E
 X
1i= jn
(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+jN(t) = n

=
nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv:
Then
gt =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]
 nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv

:
Since N(t) follows the homogeneous Poisson process, we have
gt =
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!
 nX
i=1
Z t
0
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv

: (4.55)
Rearranging terms on the right-hand side of equation (4.55), we have
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 69
gt =
Z t
0
e v
1X
n=1
e (t v)
tnn 1
n!
nX
i=1
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]n(t   v)
n 1
tn
dv
=
Z t
0
e v
1X
n=1
e (t v)
((t   v))n 1
(n   1)!
nX
i=1
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]dv
=
Z t
0
e v
1X
n=0
e (t v)
((t   v))n
n!
nX
i=1
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]dv: (4.56)
By combining the two sums on the right-hand side of equation (4.56), we obtain
gt =
Z t
0
e v
N(t v)+1X
i=1
E[(Xi ^ R)(Xi   R)+ j Vi = v]dv
=
Z t
0
e vE[N(t   v) + 1]E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+ j V1 = v]dv:
Since
E[N(t   v) + 1] = (t   v) + 1;
we have
gt =
Z t
0
e v((t   v) + 1)E[(X1 ^ R)(X1   R)+ j V1 = v]dv: (4.57)
Calculation of the sum ht
We need to consider two cases: i < j and i > j. Then
ht =
1X
n=1
P[N(t) = n]

E
 X
1i< jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

+ E
 X
1 j<in
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

=
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!

E
 X
1i< jn
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

+ E
 X
1 j<in
(Xi ^ R)(X j   R)+ j N(t) = n

: (4.58)
We have calculated the two expectations in the braces on the right-hand side of equation (4.58),
and the results are provided in equations (4.53) and (4.54). Using these results, equation (4.58)
becomes
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ht =
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!

n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
X
1i< jn
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = y]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]
 (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy + n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t v
0
X
1 j<in
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = v]
 E[(X j   R)+ j V j = y](t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dydv

=
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!

n(n   1)
Z t
0
Z t y
0
X
1i, jn
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = y]E[(X j   R)+ j V j = v]
 (t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy

: (4.59)
Rearranging terms on the right-hand side of equation (4.59), we have
ht =
Z t
0
Z t y
0
1X
n=1
e t
(t)n
n!
X
1i, jn
E[(Xi ^ R) j Vi = y]E[(X j   R)+ j V j = v]
 n(n   1)(t   y   v)
n 2
tn
dvdy
=
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)
1X
n=2
e (t y v)
((t   y   v))n 2
(n   2)!
X
1i, jn
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = y]
 E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]dvdy
=
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)
1X
n=0
e (t y v)
((t   y   v))n
n!
X
1i, jn+2
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = y]
 E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]dvdy: (4.60)
By combining the two sums on the right-hand side of equation (4.60), we obtain
ht =
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)
X
1i, jN(t y v)+2
E[(Xi ^ R)jVi = y]E[(X j   R)+jV j = v]dvdy
=
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)E[(N(t   y   v) + 2)(N(t   y   v) + 1)]E[(X1 ^ R)jV1 = y]
 E[(X1   R)+jV1 = v]dvdy; (4.61)
where
E[(N(t   y   v) + 2)(N(t   y   v) + 1)] = E[(N(t   y   v))2] + 3E[N(t   y   v)] + 2:
Since
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E[N(t   y   v)] = (t   y   v)
and
E[(N(t   y   v))2] = (E[N(t   y   v)])2 + Var[N(t   y   v)]
= 2(t   y   v)2 + (t   y   v);
we obtain
E[(N(t   y   v) + 2)(N(t   y   v) + 1)] = 2(t   y   v)2 + (t   y   v) + 3(t   y   v) + 2
= 2(t   y   v)2 + 4(t   y   v) + 2
= 2(t   y   v)2 + 4(t   y   v) + 4   2
= ((t   y   v) + 2)2   2: (4.62)
Substituting equation (4.62) into equation (4.61), we obtain
ht =
Z t
0
Z t y
0
2e (y+v)(((t   y   v) + 2)2   2)E[X1 ^ R j V1 = y]
 E[(X1   R)+ j V1 = v]dvdy: (4.63)
Concluding the proof
Having calculated the two sums gt and ht, the expectation E[XIXR] is obtained. Having calcu-
lated the three expectations on the right-hand side of equation (4.7), we obtain an expression
for the covariance Cov[XI ; XR], which is given in equation (4.1). This completes the proof of
Theorem 4.2.1.
4.4 Finding an optimal retention
Using two examples, we shall next show how to obtain the optimal retention R that maximizes
the covariance Cov[XI; XR] up to and including the time t. We shall also illustrate how R is
aected by t assuming that conditions of Corollary 4.2.2 hold true.
Example 4.4.1 Assume that larger claim sizes follow the exponential distribution with param-
eter l1 > 0. Furthermore, assume that smaller claim sizes follow the exponential distribution
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with parameter s1 > 0. Hence, the probability density functions (PDFs) fl and fs are given by
the equations
fl(x) =
1
l1
e x=l1 (4.64)
and
fs(x) =
1
s1
e x=s1 ; (4.65)
respectively, where x  0. Then we find the optimal retention R that maximizes the covariance
for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 15, where  = 2,  = 1, l1 = 1000, and s1 = 10. Results for R are shown
in Table 4.1. In addition, to show how R is aected by t, we have plotted t versus R for
t R
1 1062:320
2 1109:076
3 1130:102
4 1140:722
5 1146:992
6 1151:117
7 1154:036
8 1156:211
9 1157:894
10 1159:235
11 1160:328
12 1161:236
13 1162:004
14 1162:660
15 1163:228
Table 4.1: Optimal retention R for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 15.
t = 1; 2; : : : ; 50 in Figure 4.1. This concludes Example 4.4.1.
Example 4.4.2 Assume that larger claim sizes follow the Weibull distribution with parameters
1 > 0 and l2 > 0. Furthermore, assume that smaller claim sizes follow the Weibull distribution
with parameters 2 > 0 and s2 > 0. Hence, the PDFs fl and fs are given by the equations
fl(x) =
1
l2
 x
l2
1 1
e (x=l2)
1 (4.66)
and
fs(x) =
2
s2
 x
s2
2 1
e (x=s2)
2
; (4.67)
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Figure 4.1: Time t versus R for exponential fl and fs.
respectively, where x  0. Then we obtain the optimal retention R that maximizes the covari-
ance for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 10, where  = 1, 1 = 2 = 0:5, l2 = 6, s2 = 1, and  = 1.
The Weibull distribution with parameters  > 0 and  > 0 is heavy-tailed when 0 <  < 1.
In Figure 4.2, we plot the PDF of the Weibull distribution when  = 1,  = 0:8; 1:5, and
5. Note that when  = 0:8, then the distribution is heavy-tailed. When  = 5, we have a
symmetric distribution. In this example, the Weibull distribution is always heavy-tailed since
1 = 2 = 0:5.
Using Maple, we obtain R for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 10. Results are provided in Table 4.2. In
t R
1 44:190
2 46:364
3 47:327
4 47:827
5 48:119
6 48:307
7 48:438
8 48:534
9 48:608
10 48:666
Table 4.2: Optimal retention R for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 10.
addition, to show how R is aected by t, we have plotted t versus R for t = 1; 2; : : : ; 10 in
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Figure 4.2: The PDF of the Weibull distribution when  = 1,  = 0:8 (solid curve), 1:5 (dashed
curve), and 5 (dotted curve).
Figure 4.3. This concludes Example 4.4.2.
Figure 4.3: Time t versus R for Weibull fl and fs.
Summarizing this chapter, we have considered finding optimal reinsurance using the vari-
ance reduction approach under various scenarios. The assumptions we have made do not al-
ways hold true in the real world. Therefore, the patterns we have noted from the illustrative
examples will not always hold true either, but they are instructive.
Chapter 5
A CTE-based optimal criterion
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss a CTE-based approach for constructing an optimal reinsurance
policy. Recall that the CTE of a random variable X at the confidence level 1   , where
0    1, is defined by the equation
CTEX() = E[X j X  VaRX()]:
Unlike the optimal criteria considered by Cai and Tan (2007), and Tan et al. (2009), we shall
find a common solution for both the insurer and the reinsurer. Specifically, consider the fol-
lowing problem:
Under facultative reinsurance, the insurer and the reinsurer agree on an excess of loss rein-
surance contract. The reinsurer needs to cover the claim amount exceeding the retention R > 0
on one insurance policy issued by the insurer. Let pR be the reinsurance policy premium, and
let T be the insurer’s total cost in the presence of reinsurance. The insurer’s total cost includes
the insurer’s share of the claim and the cost of purchasing the reinsurance policy, that is,
T = XI + pR; (5.1)
where pR = (1 + )E[(X   R)+], and  > 0 is the premium loading coecient.
In Section 5.2, we shall provide expressions for CTEs of T and XR at a given confidence
level 1   . Then, we shall show graphically that in this case it is not reasonable to obtain
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an optimal reinsurance policy that is beneficial to the insurer and the reinsurer by minimizing
CTEs of XI and XR with respect to R. In Section 5.3, we shall introduce our CTE-based
method that connects with the variance reduction approach discussed in Chapter 3. In Section
5.4, we shall use two illustrative examples to show how an optimal retention can be obtained
using the criterion of Section 5.3.
5.2 CTEs of T and XR at a given confidence level 1   
From Propositions 2:1 and 3:1 of Cai and Tan (2007), we have that the VaR and the CTE of T
can be expressed by the formulas:
VaRT (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R + (1 + )E[(X   R)+] if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () + (1 + )E[(X   R)+] if R > S  1X ();
(5.2)
and
CTET (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R + (1 + )E[(X   R)+] if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () +
1

R R
S  1X ()
S X(x)dx + (1 + )E[(X   R)+] if R > S  1X ();
(5.3)
where S X is the survival function of X and  is such that 0 <  < S X(0).
Next, we calculate VaR and CTE of R. To do so, we first derive an expression for the
survival function of XR.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let the excess of loss reinsurance policy have retention R > 0. Then the
survival function of XR is given by
S XR(x) = P[X > x + R] (5.4)
for all x  0.
Proof We start by writing the survival function as follows:
S XR(x) = P[(X   R)+ > x]
= E[1f(X   R)+ > xg]:
(5.5)
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The indicator function 1 can be written as follows:
1f(X   R)+ > xg =
8>>><>>>: 1 if X   R > x; X > R; or if 0 > x; X  R;0 if X   R  x; X > R; or if 0  x; X  R: (5.6)
By substituting equation (5.6) into equation (5.5), we obtain
S XR(x) = P[X   R > x; X > R] + P[0 > x; X  R]: (5.7)
Next, we investigate the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (5.7). Starting with the
first term, we have
P[X   R > x; X > R] =
8>>><>>>: P[X > x + R] if 0  x < R;P[X > x + R] if x  R: (5.8)
As to the second term, we obtain
P[0 > x; X  R] =
8>>><>>>: 0 if 0  x < R;0 if x  R: (5.9)
By substituting equations (5.8) and (5.9) into equation (5.7), we obtain
S XR(x) =
8>>><>>>: P[X > x + R] if 0  x < R;P[X > x + R] if x  R; (5.10)
which matches the survival function of XR given in equation (5.4). This completes the proof of
Theorem 5.2.1. 
Now we are ready to derive expressions for VaRXR(;R) and CTEXR(;R).
Theorem 5.2.2 Under conditions of Theorem 5.2.1, we have
VaRXR(;R) =
8>>><>>>: S
 1
X ()   R if 0 < R  S  1X ();
0 if R > S  1X ();
(5.11)
where 0 <  < S X(0).
Proof The VaR of X at the confidence level 1    is given by
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VaRX() = S  1X (); (5.12)
and when the retention is R > 0, the VaR of XI at the confidence level 1    is given by
VaRXI (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
S  1X () if R > S
 1
X ():
(5.13)
If we can show that
VaRX() = VaRXI (;R) + VaRXR(;R); (5.14)
then by substituting equations (5.12) and (5.13) into equation (5.14), we shall obtain VaRXR(;R).
To prove that equation (5.14) holds true, we first define comonotonicity (cf., e.g., Schmeidler,
1986).
Definition 5.2.3 Random variables Y and Z are comonotonic if
FY;Z(y; z) = min(FY(y); FZ(z)) for all y; z  0;
where FY;Z is the joint CDF of Y and Z, FY is the CDF of Y , and FZ is the CDF of Z.
Denuit et al. (2005) have shown that if random variables Y1;Y2; : : : ; Yn are comonotonic
and S n =
Pn
i=1 Yi, then
VaRS n() =
nX
i=1
VaRYi():
In our case, we have
X = XI + XR:
Wang and Dhaene (1998) have proven that XI and XR are comonotonic. Therefore, equation
(5.14) holds true, and then the formula for VaRXR(;R) given by equation (5.11) is obtained.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.2. 
Theorem 5.2.4 Under conditions of Theorem 5.2.2, we have
CTEXR(;R) =
8>>><>>>: S
 1
X ()   R + 1
R 1
S  1X () R
S X(x + R)dx if 0 < R  S  1X ();
1

R 1
0
S X(x + R)dx if R > S  1X ():
(5.15)
Proof We write
5.3. An optimal criterion and the variance reduction approach 79
CTEXR(;R) = E[XR j XR  VaRXR(;R)]
= E[VaRXR(;R) + XR   VaRXR(;R) j XR  VaRXR(;R)]
= VaRXR(;R) +
1

Z 1
VaRXR (;R)
S XR(x)dx: (5.16)
We have calculated the survival function of XR and the VaR of XR at a given confidence level
1    in equations (5.4) and (5.11). Using these results, we obtain an expression for the CTE
of XR at a given confidence level 1  . Then calculations immediately lead to equation (5.15),
and thus complete the proof of Theorem 5.2.4. 
To exemplify the above proved formulas, we note that when X follows the exponential
distribution with mean  > 0, we have
CTET (;R) =
8>>><>>>: R + (1 + )e
 R= if 0 < R    ln;
  ln + (1 + )e R= + 1

(   e R=) if R >   ln;
(5.17)
and
CTEXR(;R) =
8>>><>>>:   ln   R +  if 0 < R    ln;1

e R= if R >   ln:
(5.18)
Next, in Figure 5.1, we plot CTET (;R) and CTEXR(;R) as functions of R when  = 0:05
and  = 10. We see from Figure 5.1 that a common solution cannot be obtained for the insurer
and the reinsurer by minimizing CTET (;R) or CTEXR(;R) with respect to R. To construct
an optimal reinsurance policy that is beneficial to both parties, we therefore consider another
CTE-based approach, which is the topic of the next section.
5.3 An optimal criterion and the variance reduction approach
We now discuss an optimal criterion that connects with the variance reduction approach con-
sidered in Chapter 3. We write
CTEXI (;R) =
1

E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] (5.19)
and
CTEXR(;R) =
1

E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]: (5.20)
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Figure 5.1: Retention R versus CTET (;R) (solid curve), and R versus CTEXR(;R) (dashed
curve).
Next, we investigate the two expectations on the right-hand side of equations (5.19) and (5.20).
Denote Cov[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g; XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] by a1. Then
a1 = E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)gXR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
  E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g]E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]: (5.21)
Note that when  approaches 1, then the terms VaRXI (;R) and VaRXR(;R) in the indicator
functions become small. Hence, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (5.21) con-
verges to E[XIXR] and the second term, which is the product of the two expectations on the
right-hand side of equation (5.21), converges to E[XI]E[XR]. Then we can consider a1 to be
a special case of the covariance Cov[XI ; XR], which we used to obtain an optimal retention
in Chapter 3. To obtain an optimal retention that maximizes a1, we first need to obtain an
expression for a1.
Theorem 5.3.1 Under conditions of Theorem 5.2.2, we have
a1 =
8>>><>>>: b1 when 0 < R  S
 1
X ();
b2 when R > S  1X ();
(5.22)
where
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b1 = R
Z 1
S  1X ()
(x   R)dFX(x)   R
 Z 1
S  1X () R
S X(x + R)dx + (S  1X ()   R)

and
b2 = R
Z 1
R
(x   R)dFX(x)  
 Z R
S  1X ()
S X(x)dx + S  1X ()
 Z 1
0
S X(x + R)dx:
Proof We investigate the three expectations on the right-hand side of equation (5.21) sepa-
rately. We begin with the first expectation:
E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)gXR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
= E[R(X   R)1fX  S  1X ()g1fX  Rg]: (5.23)
By combining the two indicator functions on the right-hand side of equation (5.23), we obtain
E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)gXR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] = E[R(X   R)1fX  max(S  1X ();R)g]:
(5.24)
The right-hand side of equation (5.24) can be written as follows:
E[R(X   R)1fX  max(S  1X ();R)g] =
8>>><>>>: R
R 1
S  1X ()
(x   R)dFX(x) if 0 < R  S  1X ();
R
R 1
R
(x   R)dFX(x) if R > S  1X ():
(5.25)
Next, we calculate the expectation of XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g on the right-hand side of equation
(5.21) and have that
E[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] = E[(XI + VaRXI (;R)   VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g]
= E[(XI   VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g]
+ VaRXI (;R)P[XI  VaRXI (;R)]
= E[(XI   VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] + VaRXI (;R):
(5.26)
The expectation on the right-hand side of equation (5.26) can be written as follows:
E[(XI   VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] =
Z 1
VaRXI (;R)
S XI (x)dx:
We now write the above expectation in terms of the survival function of X. We have
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E[(XI   VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] =
Z R
VaRXI (;R)
S X(x)dx: (5.27)
Using the result for VaRXI (;R) in equation (5.13), we have that equation (5.27) can be written
as follows:
E[(XI VaRXI (;R))1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] =
8>>><>>>: 0 if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();R R
S  1X ()
S X(x) if R > S  1X ():
(5.28)
By substituting equation (5.28) into equation (5.26), we obtain
E[(XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g] =
8>>><>>>: R if 0 < R  S
 1
X ();R R
S  1X ()
S X(x)dx + S  1X () if R > S
 1
X ():
(5.29)
Similarly, we can rewrite the expectation of XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g on the right-hand side of
equation (5.21). We obtain the equation
E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] = E[(XR   VaRXR(;R))1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] + VaRXR(;R):
(5.30)
The expectation on the right-hand side of equation (5.30) can be written as follows:
E[(XR   VaRXR(;R))1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] =
Z 1
VaRXR (;R)
S XR(x)dx
=
Z 1
VaRXR (;R)
S X(x + R)dx: (5.31)
Note that using the result from Theorem 5.2.1, which states that S XR(x) = S X(x + R) for x  0,
we obtain the survival function of X instead of XR on the right-hand side of equation (5.31).
Using the result for VaRXR(;R) given in equation (5.11), we have that equation (5.31) can be
written as follows:
E[(XR VaRXR(;R))1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] =
8>>><>>>:
R 1
S  1X () R
S X(x + R)dx if 0 < R  S  1X ();R 1
0
S X(x + R)dx if R > S  1X ():
(5.32)
By substituting equation (5.32) into equation (5.30), we obtain
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E[XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g] =
8>>><>>>:
R 1
S  1X () R
S X(x + R)dx + (S  1X ()   R) if 0 < R  S  1X ();R 1
0
S X(x + R)dx if R > S  1X ():
(5.33)
Using the results that we have calculated for the three expectations on the right-hand side
of equation (5.21), equation (5.22) follows, which completes the proof of Theorem 5.3.1. 
5.4 Finding optimal retention
We now obtain the retention that maximizes
a1 := Cov[XI1fXI  VaRXI (;R)g; XR1fXR  VaRXR(;R)g]
when X follows the exponential distribution (Subsection 5.4.1) and also the two-parameter
Pareto distribution (Subsection 5.4.2). We call this maximizing R the optimal retention and
denote it by R for the rest of this chapter.
5.4.1 Optimal retention when X is exponential
When X follows the exponential distribution with mean  > 0, then we have
a1 =
8>>><>>>: k1 if 0 < R    ln;k2 if R >   ln; (5.34)
where
k1 = R
Z 1
  ln
(x   R)1

e x=dx   R
 Z 1
  ln R
e (x+R)=dx + (  ln   R)

(5.35)
and
k2 = R
Z 1
R
(x   R)1

e x=dx  
 Z R
  ln
e x=dx    ln
 Z 1
0
e (x+R)=dx: (5.36)
Next, we obtain values that maximize k1 and k2.
Theorem 5.4.1 Let X follow the exponential distribution with mean  > 0. Furthermore, let
the excess of loss reinsurance policy have retention R > 0. Finally, let the given confidence
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level be 1    for some 0 <  < 1. Then k1, which is given by equation (5.35), is maximized at
R1 =
 ln    +     ln
2   2 ; (5.37)
and k2, which is given in equation (5.36), is maximized at
R2 =  ( LambertW( 2 expf 1    +  lng)); (5.38)
where LambertW is the Lambert function. Moreover, the value R2 is assumed to satisfy the
condition
R2

  2    +  ln + 4e R2= < 0: (5.39)
Note 5.4.2 The Lambert W function, which is also known as the product algorithm or the
omega function, is a set of functions, namely the branches of the inverse relation of the function
z = WeW , where eW is the exponential function andW is any complex number (cf., e.g., Disney
and Lambrecht, 2008).
Proof We start by finding the critical point(s) of k1. By dierentiating k1 with respect to R, we
have
@
@R
k1 =   ln +    2R   2 + 2 ln + 22R: (5.40)
Next, we set
@
@R
k1 = 0;
and solve for R. The solution, which we denote by R1, is given by equation (5.37). The critical
point R1 maximizes k1 if 
@
@R
2
k1

R=R1
< 0:
The second derivative of k1 with respect to R is

@
@R
2
k1 =  2
Z 1
  ln
1

e x=dx   

  e R=
Z 1
  ln R
1

e x=dx + e( ln)=   

  

  e R=
Z 1
  ln R
1

e x=dx

  R
1

e R=
Z 1
  ln R
1

e x=dx   1

e( ln)=

= 22   2 < 0:
We conclude that R1 maximizes k1.
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Similarly, we obtain the critical point(s) of k2. By dierentiating k2 with respect to R, we
obtain
@
@R
k2 = e R=   Re R= + e R=   2e 2R=   e R= ln: (5.41)
Then we set
@
@R
k2 = 0;
and solve for R using the “solve” feature in Maple. The solution, which we denote by R2, is
given by equation (5.38). The critical point R2 maximizes k2 if

@
@R
2
k2

R=R2
< 0: (5.42)
We dierentiate k2 twice with respect to R and obtain

@
@R
2
k2 =  R

e R=   2
Z 1
R
1

e x=dx + 2R
1

e R= +
2

e 2R=
Z 1
0
e x=dx
+ e R=
1

e R=
Z 1
0
e x=dx   1
2
e R=
Z 1
0
e x=dx
 Z R
  ln
e x=dx    ln

=
R

  2    +  ln

e R= + 4e 2R=:
Condition (5.42) is satisfied provided that
R2

  2    +  ln

e R2= + 4e 2R2= < 0: (5.43)
When multiplying both sides of (5.43) by eR2=, we obtain condition (5.39). This completes the
proof of Theorem 5.4.1. 
To illustrate graphically, we plot R versus a1 when  = 0:2 and  = 10 (left panel in Figure
5.2), and when  = 0:6 and  = 10 (right panel in Figure 5.2). We note that on the left panel,
the covariance a1 is maximized in the interval 0 < R    ln, and the optimal retention R is
equal to 13:047, which corresponds to the value of R1. On the right panel, the covariance a1 is
maximized in the interval R >   ln, and the optimal retention R is equal to 14:259, which
corresponds to the value of R2.
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Figure 5.2: Retention R versus a1 for 0 < R    ln (solid curve) and R >   ln (dotted
curve). Left panel:  = 0:2 and  = 10. Right panel:  = 0:6 and  = 10.
5.4.2 Optimal retention when X is the two-parameter Pareto
When X follows the two-parameter Pareto distribution with parameters a > 1 and b > 0, then
we have
a1 =
8>>><>>>: k3 when 0 < R  b=(
1=a)   b;
k4 when R > b=(1=a)   b;
(5.44)
where
k3 = R
Z 1
b=(1=a) b
(x R) ab
a
(x + b)a+1
dx R
 Z 1
b=(1=a) b R
 b
x + b + R
a
dx+
 b
1=a
 b R

(5.45)
and
k4 = R
Z 1
R
(x   R) ab
a
(x + b)a+1
dx  
 Z R
b=(1=a) b
 b
x + b
a
dx + 
 b
1=a
  b
 Z 1
0
 b
x + b + R
a
dx:
(5.46)
Next, we obtain values that maximize k3 and k4.
Theorem 5.4.3 Let X follow the two-parameter Pareto distribution with parameters a > 1 and
b > 0. Furthermore, let the excess of loss reinsurance policy have retention R > 0. Finally, let
the confidence level be 1   for some 0 <  < 1. Then k3, which is given in equation (5.45), is
maximized at
R3 =
1
   2

  b
a   1
 1=a    1=ab + b + (a 1)=a b
a   1 + 
(a 1)=ab   b

; (5.47)
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and the value R4 that maximizes k4, which is given in equation (5.46), must satisfy the following
two conditions:
b
a   1
 b
b + R2
a 1
  R2
 b
b + R2
a
  2b
2a
(a   1)(b + R2)2a 1 + ab
a+1(a 1)=a   aba+1 + ba+1 = 0;
(5.48)
 
 b
b + R2
a
+aR2
ba
(b + R2)a+1
+(2a 1) 2b
2a
(a   1)(b + R2)2a 
a2ba+1(a 1)=a   a2ba+1 + aba+1
(a   1)(b + R2)a+1 < 0:
(5.49)
Proof We start by finding the critical point(s) of k3. By dierentiating k3 with respect to R, we
obtain
@
@R
k3 =
 b
a   1
(a 1)=a +
 b
1=a
  b

   R

  R   

  b
(1   a)(1 a)=a + 
 b
1=a
  b   R

+ 2R
=
b
a   1
(a 1)=a +
 b
1=a
  b

   2R +  b
(1   a)(1 a)=a   
2 b
1=a
+ 2b + 2R: (5.50)
Next, we set
@
@R
k3 = 0;
and solve for R. The solution, which we denote by R3, is provided by equation (5.47). The
critical point R3 maximizes k3 if 
@
@R
2
k3

R=R3
< 0:
This is equivalent to  2+ 2 < 0, which always holds. Therefore, we conclude that the value
R3 maximizes k3.
Similarly, we obtain the critical point(s) of k4. By dierentiating k4 with respect to R, we
obtain
@
@R
k4 =
 b
a   1
 b
b + R
a 1
+ R
 b
b + R
a
+ R
 ba
a   1(1   a)(b + R)
 a +
 b
b + R
a
  aRba(b + R) a 1

  2R
 b
b + R
a
+ aR2ba(b + R) a 1   b
a
a   1(1   a)(b + R)
 a

 ba
1   a(b + R)
 a+1   b
a
1   a
 b
1=a
 a+1
+ 
 b
1=a
  b

  b
a
a   1(b + R)
 a+1 b
a
1   a (1   a)(b + R)
 a:
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Then
@
@R
k4 =
b
a   1
 b
b + R
a 1
  R
 b
b + R
a
  2b
2a
(a   1)(b + R)2a 1 + ab
a+1(a 1)=a   aba+1 + ba+1:
(5.51)
We set
@
@R
k4 = 0;
and solve for R. The solution, which we denote by R4, satisfies condition (5.48). The critical
point R4 maximizes k4 if the second derivative of k4 with respect to R evaluated at R4 is negative.
The second derivative of k4 with respect to R is

@
@R
2
k4 =
ba
a   1(1   a)(b + R)
 a + aRba(b + R) a 1   2b
2a
a   1(1   2a)(b + R)
 2a
  a(b + R) a 1ab
a+1(a 1)=a   aba+1 + ba+1
a   1
=  
 b
b + R
a
+ aR
ba
(b + R)a+1
+ (2a   1) 2b
2a
(a   1)(b + R)2a
  a
2ba+1(a 1)=a   a2ba+1 + aba+1
(a   1)(b + R)a+1 :
We note that 
@
@R
2
k4

R=R4
< 0
if condition (5.49) is satisfied. In other words, condition (5.49) must be satisfied for k4 to be
maximized at R4. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.4.3. 
To illustrate graphically, we plot R versus a1 when  = 0:05, a = 3, and b = 10 (left panel
in Figure 5.3), and when  = 0:5, a = 3, and b = 10 (right panel in Figure 5.3). On the left
panel, the covariance a1 is maximized in the interval 0 < R  b=(1=a)   b, and the optimal
retention R is equal to 14:964, which corresponds to the value of R3. On the right panel, the
covariance a1 is maximized in the interval R > b=(1=a)   b, and the optimal retention R is
equal to 15:922, which corresponds to the value of R4.
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Figure 5.3: Retention R versus a1 for 0 < R  b=(1=a)   b (solid curve) and R > b=(1=a)   b
(dotted curve). Left panel:  = 0:05, a = 3, and b = 10. Right panel:  = 0:5, a = 3, and
b = 10.
Chapter 6
Likelihood of purchasing a property
6.1 Introduction
When buying or negotiating selling properties, a number of factors could influence the out-
come. Among them are the seller’s reservation (i.e., minimal) price, the shape of the negotiated
selling price distribution, and the buyer’s reservation (i.e., maximal aordable) price. Various
studies of these key factors have been reported in the literature.
For example, Rothschild (1974) discusses an optimal search strategy from the buyer’s per-
spective that focuses on minimizing the total cost of buying properties. The buyer’s reserva-
tion price is determined based on the total expected expense from searching and purchasing.
Gastwirth (1976) considers a model for obtaining the expected minimal price after searching
through a number of targets. Egozcue et al. (2013) derive an optimal strategy that maximizes
the expected real estate selling price when only one of the two remaining buyers has made an
oer.
Various distributions of the negotiated selling prices have been discussed. Some examples
are the uniform distribution (Stigler, 1962), the normal distribution (Nelson, 1970), and the
triangular distribution (Gastwirth, 1976).
Other approaches to modelling negotiated selling prices include the hedonic pricing model
discussed in Gundimeda (2006), the repeated negotiated selling method considered by Baroni
et al. (2007), and the replication method suggested by Lai et al. (2008).
Our research has been motivated by the following problem: Consider a buyer who wants
to purchase a property, and suppose that there are a number of similar properties on the market
90
6.1. Introduction 91
for sale. The buyer has a reservation price in mind and looks at the oers one at a time. If
the negotiated selling price is below the buyer’s reservation price, the buyer purchases the
property immediately and avoids the risk of losing the property to another potential buyer. If
the negotiated selling price is above the buyer’s reservation price, then the buyer moves on to
the next oer. Unlike in the case considered by Stigler (1962) and Gastwirth (1976), we assume
that if the buyer passes on an oer, he/she does not have the option to go back and review it.
This scenario is as realistic as those of Stigler (1962) and Gastwirth (1976) because sellers
and real estate agents often have multiple buying oers and, therefore, may not wait for one
potential buyer’s reply. The search ends when the buyer purchases a property with a negotiated
selling price lower than her/his reservation price. If all of the properties under consideration
are being sold at a price higher than the reservation price, then the buyer does not purchase a
property.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:
 In Section 6.2, we derive a formula for the probability of purchasing a property during
a specified time period under the simplest yet practically possible scenario. We assume
that the buyer’s reservation price does not change during the search period. Furthermore,
we assume that the negotiated selling prices are i.i.d. random variables.
 In Section 6.3, we consider various scenarios under which one or more assumptions made
in Section 6.2 no longer hold true and obtain a formula for the probability of buying a
property during a given time interval for each case.
 In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, we discuss modelling the dependence among negotiated selling
prices. Three methods are considered including direct representation, copula representa-
tion, and background risk model.
 In Section 6.6, we review past studies on finding the bounds and direct representations of
the tail probability for some discrete distributions. We may need the results from these
studies to calculate the probability of buying a property.
 In Section 6.7, we calculate the (unconditional) probability of the buyer purchasing one
condominium or one detached property in the London and St. Thomas area under as-
sumptions made in Section 6.2.
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6.2 An illustrative case
We are interested in the probability of the buyer purchasing a property during a search time-
interval, say (t0; t1]. Whatever the initial impression we have gotten about the problem, it is
far from trivial. To unearth the crux of the matter, we next provide an illustrative solution in a
highly simplified, yet reasonable, scenario.
Let H be a binary random variable taking on two values: 1 if a property is purchased during
the time period (t0; t1] and 0 otherwise. Naturally, the number of properties that interest the
buyer and are available on the market during the noted time period is random, and we denote
it by N, which can take on any integer value n = 0; 1; : : : (e.g., N might follow the Poisson
distribution). The rule of total probability immediately gives us the equation
P[H = 1] =
1X
n=1
P[H = 1 j N = n]P[N = n]; (6.1)
where the summation starts at n = 1 because the probability P[H = 1 j N = 0] is obviously
equal to 0: you cannot buy a property if there is not any on the market. The above equation has
reduced our problem of calculating P[H = 1] to that of calculating the conditional probability
P[H = 1 j N = n] of purchasing a property for every n  1 when there are n properties on
the market during the search period (t0; t1]. To successfully proceed further, we need to make
additional assumptions on the model, which we shall do later. An illustrative example follows
next.
We assume the simplest yet practically reasonable model: First, during the search period,
let the buyer’s budget stay the same and, therefore, her/his reservation price is the same for ev-
ery property to be considered irrespectively on the time of negotiations and/or sale during the
search period. Furthermore, we assume that the properties that the buyer is targeting have simi-
lar features and that the sellers hold similar negotiating power. Hence, the (abstract) negotiated
selling prices, say Zn;1;Zn;2; : : : ; Zn;n, follow the same distribution for each property consid-
ered. Next, we assume that the sellers of the properties do not communicate with each other
on the negotiated selling matters. Therefore, the negotiated selling prices Zn;1;Zn;2; : : : ; Zn;n
become independent random variables. In summary, we assume for the rest of this section
that Zn;1;Zn;2; : : : ; Zn;n are i.i.d. random variables. Denote the CDF of each of these random
variables Zn;i by , that is,
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(x) = P[Zn;i  x]
for every x  0.
Let the buyer’s reservation price be u. Then, for every n  1, the probability P[H = 1 j
N = n] is equal to 1   (1   (u))n, where (1   (u))n is the probability that the buyer is unable
to purchase a property after the search since the price of every searched property on the market
exceeds the buyer’s reservation price. Hence, we have the formula
P[H = 1] = 1   P[N = 0]  
1X
n=1
(1   (u))nP[N = n]
= 1  G(1   (u)); (6.2)
where G(y) :=
P1
n=0 y
nP[N = n] is the probability generating function of N.
Example 6.2.1 Let N follow the Poisson distribution with some mean, which we denote by
t0;t1 , with subindices t0 and t1 because it depends on the search time-interval (t0; t1]. Then the
probability generating function G is given by
G(y) = expf (1   y)t0;t1g:
Therefore, equation (6.2) becomes
P[H = 1] = 1   exp    (u)t0;t1	: (6.3)
Equation (6.3) is useful from the practical point of view because it allows us to estimate the
probability P[H = 1] given values of the parameters u, t0, and t1, as well as either historical
data or some knowledge-based considerations to get an estimate of the mean (t0; t1]. Next, we
view the mean t0;t1 of the underlying Poisson process governed by an intensity function (t),
which gives the expression (t0; t1] =
R t1
t0
(t)dt. In this case, we have the equation
P[H = 1] = 1   exp

  (u)
Z t1
t0
(t)dt

: (6.4)
This equation is particularly useful to see the dynamics of the probability of purchasing a
property when the search period (t0; t1] varies, which can be utilized by the buyer to make
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certain time adjustments to her/his property-hunting strategy.
So far, we have presented formulas for the likelihood of the successful purchasing of a
property under simplified assumptions. Yet, the obtained results are illuminating and convey
basic features of what we shall see in the following sections under relaxed and thus more
practical assumptions.
6.3 The likelihood of purchasing
This section consists of four subsections, where we impose, step by step, additional simpli-
fying assumptions. Table 6.1 overviews the subsections from the viewpoint of assumptions.
Naturally, the first subsection is the most general.
Negotiated sales price
Subsection Identically distributed Independent
6.3.1 - -
6.3.2 - X
6.3.3 X -
6.3.4 X X
Table 6.1: An overview of the following subsections.
6.3.1 Most general case
We now drop all the assumptions made in Section 6.2. In other words, the reservation price may
or may not be the same for each property available on the market. We shall denote the reserva-
tion prices by un;1; un;2; : : : ; un;n. Furthermore, the sales prices may or may not be independent.
Finally, the sales prices may or may not be identically distributed. Under these circumstances,
we next derive an expression for the conditional probability Pn[H = 1] := P[H = 1 j N = n].
Theorem 6.3.1 In the most general case, the conditional probability of the buyer purchasing
a property is given by
Pn[H = 1] = Pn[Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]; (6.5)
where, for n = 0; 1, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = 0;
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and for n = 2, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1];
and for n  3, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
+
nX
j=3

Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]

:
Proof When n = 0; 1, then Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = 0, and when n = 2, then Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 >
un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]. Next, we shall prove that for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   2 with
n  3, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i > un;i]
= Pn[Zn;i+1  un;i+1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ;Zn;i > un;i] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i+1 > un;i+1]
 Pn[Zn;i+1 > un;i+1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i > un;i]; (6.6)
and furthermore, for i = n   1 and n  2, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = Pn[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]:
(6.7)
Note from equations (6.6) and (6.7) that for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   1 with n  3, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ;Zn;i > un;i] = Pn[Zn;i+1  un;i+1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i > un;i]
+
nX
j=i+2

Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=i+1
Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]

;
and for i = 1 with n  3, we have
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Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1] +
nX
j=3

Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]

:
This would complete the proof of Theorem 6.3.1. Hence, our goal is to establish equations
(6.6) and (6.7).
At the time of the first oer, there are two possible outcomes: First, if the selling price
is below un;1, then the buyer will purchase the first property and Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1  un;1] = 1.
Second, if the first oer is above un;1, then the buyer will not purchase the property, and instead,
will move on to the second property. The conditional probability of the buyer purchasing a
property can then be expanded in the following way:
Pn[H = 1] = Pn[H = 1;Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1;Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1  un;1]Pn[Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]:
When checking the second property, the buyer will once again face two outcomes. The selling
price is either below un;2 or above un;2. We would then need to expand Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]
in the following way:
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2 > un;2]Pn[Zn;2 > un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]:
This process will continue until the final oer. Similar to the expansion of Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 >
un;1], we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; Zn;2 > un;2] = Pn[Zn;3  un;3 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2 > un;2]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; Zn;2 > un;2;Zn;3 > un;3]
 Pn[Zn;3 > un;3 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2 > un;2]:
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Analogously, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ;Zn;n 2 > un;n 2] = Pn[Zn;n 1  un;n 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 2 > un;n 2]
+ Pn[Zn;n 1 > un;n 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 2 > un;n 2]
 Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]:
When the buyer checks the final oer, he/she has two choices remaining: If the price is below
un;n, then the buyer will purchase the property and Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n  un;n] = 1.
If the price is above un;n, then the buyer will not make a purchase and Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 >
un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = 0. Therefore,
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
= Pn[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n]
 Pn[Zn;n > un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]:
Then we obtain
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = Pn[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]:
In order to express Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] in terms of the conditional distribution function of
Zn;i+1 j Zn;1; : : : ; Zn;i, we start with the expression for Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ;Zn;n 1 > un;n 1].
Then we work backwards to find Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 2 > un;n 2], and so on. In
general, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n  2 with n  3, we obtain equation (6.6) and for i = n  1, we obtain
equation (6.7). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.3.1. 
From equation (6.1) and Theorem 6.3.1, we immediately obtain the formula
P[H = 1] = s1 + s2 + s3; (6.8)
where
s1 =
1X
n=1
Pn[Zn;1  un;1]P[N = n];
s2 =
1X
n=2
Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]P[N = n];
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and
s3 =
1X
n=3
Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]
nX
j=3
Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]P[N = n]:
When the negotiated selling prices Zn;1;Zn;2; : : : ; Zn;n are independent of the number N of
properties on sale, the conditional probability Pn becomes the unconditional P. We then obtain
the formula
P[H = 1] = P[Zn;1  un;1](1   P[N = 0])
+ P[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]P[Zn;1 > un;1](1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
P[Zn;1 > un;1]P[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;i > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
P[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ;Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]P[N  j]: (6.9)
Next, if we assume that the number N of properties on sale during the search interval
(t0; t1] follows the Poisson distribution with mean t0;t1 , then P[N = 0] in equation (6.9) can be
replaced by expf t0;t1g, and P[N  k] by
P1
i=k(
i
t0;t1=i!) expf t0;t1g.
6.3.2 Independent negotiated selling prices
Here we drop the assumption that the reservation price is the same for each property available
on the market. We also drop the assumption that the sales prices are identically distributed.
Under these circumstances, we next obtain an expression for Pn[H = 1].
Corollary 6.3.2 Let the sales prices be independent. Then we obtain the following expression
for the conditional probability of buying a property:
Pn[H = 1] = Pn[Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]; (6.10)
where
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Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0 when n = 0; 1;
Pn[Zn;2  un;2] when n = 2;
Pn[Zn;2  un;2] +Pnj=3 Pn[Zn; j  un; j]Q j 1k=2 Pn[Zn;k > un;k] when n  3:
(6.11)
Proof We shall prove that, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   2 with n  3, the conditional probability
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] can be obtained using the following recursive relationship:
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i > un;i]
= Pn[Zn;i+1  un;i+1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i+1 > un;i+1]Pn[Zn;i+1 > un;i+1]; (6.12)
and for i = n   1 with n  2,
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = Pn[Zn;n  un;n]: (6.13)
Note that from equations (6.12) and (6.13), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   1 with n  3, we immediately
get
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;i > un;i]
= Pn[Zn;i+1  un;i+1] +
nX
j=i+2

Pn[Zn; j  un; j]
j 1Y
k=i+1
Pn[Zn;k > un;k]

:
When i = 1 with n  3, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2] +
nX
j=3

Pn[Zn; j  un; j]
j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k]

:
When we set k = 1 with n = 0 or 1, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = 0;
and when n = 2, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2]:
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This would complete the proof of Corollary 6.3.2. Hence, to complete the proof of the corol-
lary, we need to establish equations (6.12) and (6.13).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.3.1, we have
Pn[H = 1] = Pn[H = 1;Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1;Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1  un;1]Pn[Zn;1  un;1]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[Zn;1  un;1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]:
Then we write
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] = Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2  un;2]Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2 > un;2]Pn[Zn;2 > un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1;Zn;2 > un;2]Pn[Zn;2 > un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
= Pn[Zn;2  un;2] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; Zn;2 > un;2]Pn[Zn;2 > un;2]:
Since Zn;1 and Zn;2 are independent of each other, we have the equation Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 >
un;1] = Pn[Zn;2  un;2]. Similarly, we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; Zn;2 > un;2] = Pn[Zn;3  un;3]
+ Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; Zn;2 > un;2;Zn;3 > un;3]
 Pn[Zn;3 > un;3]:
Proceeding in a similar fashion, we obtain
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 2 > un;n 2]
= Pn[Zn;n 1  un;n 1] + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]Pn[Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]:
Finally, for Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1], we have
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = Pn[Zn;n  un;n]:
6.3. The likelihood of purchasing 101
In order to express Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1] in terms of the distribution function of Zn;i, we
start with Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1], then work backwards to find Pn[H = 1 j
Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 2 > un;n 2], and so on. In general, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n   2 with n  3, we
obtain equation (6.12), and when i = n  1, then we obtain equation (6.13). This completes the
proof of Corollary 6.3.2. 
From equation (6.1) and Corollary 6.3.2, we have that the (unconditional) probability of
the buyer purchasing a property is given by
P[H = 1] =
1X
n=1
Pn[Zn;1  un;1]P[N = n] +
1X
n=2
Pn[Zn;2  un;2]Pn[Zn;1 > un;1]P[N = n]
+
1X
n=3
Pn[Z1 > u1]
nX
j=3

Pn[Zn; j  un; j]
j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k]

P[N = n]: (6.14)
When the negotiated selling prices are independent of the number N of properties on sale,
the (unconditional) probability of the buyer purchasing a property becomes
P[H = 1] = P[Zn;1  un;1](1   P[N = 0])
+ P[Zn;2  un;2]P[Zn;1 > un;1](1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
P[Zn;1 > un;1]P[Zn; j  un; j]
 j 1Y
k=2
P[Zn;k > un;k]

P[N  j]: (6.15)
6.3.3 Identically distributed negotiated selling prices
Here we drop the assumption that the reservation price is the same for each property on sale.
We also drop the assumption that the negotiated selling prices are independent. Under these
circumstances, we next derive an expression for Pn[H = 1].
Corollary 6.3.3 Let the distributions of the sales prices be identical. Then we obtain the fol-
lowing expression for the conditional probability of buying a property:
Pn[H = 1] = n(un;1) + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1](1   n(un;1)); (6.16)
where
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Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 when n = 0; 1;
Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1] when n = 2;
Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1]
+
Pn
j=3

Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]
Q j 1k=2 Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;k 1 > un;k 1] when n  3:
(6.17)
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.3.1. The main dierence is that we now
assume that the sales prices are identically distributed, that is, they follow the same distribution
as that of a random variable Z. This concludes the proof of Corollary 6.3.3. 
From equation (6.1) and Corollary 6.3.3, we immediately obtain the (unconditional) prob-
ability of the buyer purchasing a property:
P[H = 1] =
1X
n=1
n(un;1)P[N = n] +
1X
n=2
Pn[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1](1   n(un;1))P[N = n]
+
1X
n=3
(1   n(un;1))
nX
j=3
Pn[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
Pn[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]P[N = n]; (6.18)
where
n(u) = Pn[Z  u]:
When the negotiated selling prices are independent of the number N of properties on sale,
the conditional probability Pn becomes the unconditional P, and n becomes , which has been
defined in Section 6.2. Therefore, we have
P[H = 1] = (un;1)(1   P[N = 0])
+ P[Zn;2  un;2 j Zn;1 > un;1](1   (u1))(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
(1   (un;1))P[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;i > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1]

j 1Y
k=2
P[Zn;k > un;k j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;k 1 > un;k 1]P[N  j]: (6.19)
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6.3.4 IID negotiated selling prices
We now drop the assumption that the buyer’s reservation price stays the same and derive an
expression for Pn[H = 1].
Corollary 6.3.4 Let the sales prices be i.i.d. Then the conditional probability of the buyer
purchasing a property is given by
Pn[H = 1] = n(un;1) + Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1](1   n(un;1)); (6.20)
where
Pn[H = 1 j Zn;1 > un;1]
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0 when n = 0; 1;
n(un;2) when n = 2;
n(un;2) +
Pn
j=3

n(un; j)
Q j 1
k=2(1   n(un;k))

when n  3:
(6.21)
Proof The proof of Corollary 6.3.4 is similar to that of Corollary 6.3.2. The main dierence is
that the random variables of the sales prices are now identically distributed, say, like a random
variable Z. This concludes the proof of Corollary 6.3.4. 
From equation (6.1) and Corollary 6.3.4, we have the formula
P[H = 1] =
1X
n=1
n(un;1)P[N = n] +
1X
n=2
n(un;2)(1   n(un;1))P[N = n]
+
1X
n=3
(1   n(un;1))
nX
j=3

n(un; j)
j 1Y
k=2
(1   n(un;k))

P[N = n]: (6.22)
Next, when the negotiated selling price Z is independent of the number N of properties
on sale, then the conditional probability Pn becomes the unconditional P, and n becomes .
Consequently, we have
P[H = 1] = m1 + m2 + m3; (6.23)
where
m1 = (un;1)(1   P[N = 0]);
m2 = (un;2)(1   (un;1))(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1]);
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and
m3 =
1X
j=3
(1   (un;1))(un; j)
 j 1Y
k=2
(1   (un;k)

P[N  j]:
Note that when the reservation price stays the same, say u, equation (6.23) becomes equation
(6.2) given in Section 6.2.
6.4 Modelling price dependence
The dependence has come into our above considerations via the conditional probability P[Zn; j 
un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1], which can also be written as follows:
P[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1] = 1   P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j > un; j]P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 > un; j 1] : (6.24)
Hence, in general, we have to learn how to calculate, or estimate, the joint survival probability
of the negotiated selling prices. In what follows, we shall discuss direct representations of the
joint survival probability as well as via survival copulas. These are the topics of Subsections
6.4.1 and 6.4.2, respectively.
6.4.1 Direct representation
Here we present three direct representations of the joint survival function. They come from
various studies in the literature and are very popular in actuarial literature.
Multivariate Pareto of the second kind
The joint survival function of the multivariate Pareto of the second kind is given by (cf., e.g.,
Arnold, 1983; Asimit et al., 2010)
P[X1 > x1; : : : ; Xn > xn] =
 nX
i=1
xi   n;i
i
+ 1
 a
(6.25)
for xi  n;i with n;i 2 R and i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where i > 0 and a > 0.
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Marshall and Olkin’s multivariate exponential distribution
The joint survival function of the Marshall and Olkin’s (1967) multivariate exponential distri-
bution is given by
P[X1 > x1; : : : ; Xn > xn] = exp

 
nX
i=1
ixi   n+1max(x1; x2; : : : ; xn)

(6.26)
for xi > 0 with i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where i > 0 and n+1  0.
Multivariate Weibull distribution
The joint survival function of the multivariateWeibull distribution is given by (cf., e.g., Hougaard,
1986)
P[X1 > x1; : : : ; Xn > xn] = exp

 
 nX
i=1
ix
p
i
l
(6.27)
for xi  0 with i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where l > 0, p > 0, and i > 0.
6.4.2 Copula representation
We now consider using the survival copula to obtain the joint survival function. A copula is
defined as follows (cf., e.g., Nelson, 2006):
Definition 6.4.1 A copula is a multivariate probability distribution for which the marginal
probability distribution of each variable is uniform.
The copula representation of a joint survival function is given by (cf., e.g., Nelson, 2006)
P[X1 > x1; X2 > x2; : : : ; Xn > xn] = C¯(S X1(x1); S X2(x2); : : : ; S Xn(xn)) (6.28)
for xi 2 R with i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where C¯ is the survival copula and S i is the survival function
of Xi. From equation (6.28), we note that to find the copula representation of a joint survival
function, marginal survival functions must be obtained. To illustrate, we next present the sur-
vival copula that can be used to obtain the joint survival function of the multivariate Pareto
distribution of the second kind. Its marginal survival functions are given by
S Xi(xi) =
 xi   n;i
i
+ 1
 a
(6.29)
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for xi  n;i with i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Lemma 6.4.2 The joint survival function of the multivariate Pareto distribution in equation
(6.25) can be obtained using the following survival copula (Clayton copula):
C¯(S X1(x1); S X2(x2); : : : ; S Xn(xn)) =
 nX
i=1
(S Xi(xi))
 1=a   n + 1
 a
: (6.30)
Proof We start with the equation
xi   n;i
i
=
 xi   n;i
i
+ 1
 a 1=a
  1
= (S Xi(xi))
 1=a   1: (6.31)
Now we recall the joint survival function of the multivariate Pareto distribution, which is given
in equation (6.25). Next, we replace the term (xi   n;i)=i by the expression on the right-hand
side of equation (6.31). Then we obtain the survival copula given in equation (6.30). This
completes the proof of Theorem 6.4.2. 
Note 6.4.3 Schweizer and Wol (1981) have shown Kendall’s tau of two variables X and Y is
given by a=(a + 2). The Clayton copula belongs to the family of Archimedean copulas. Some
of the other commonly known copulas in this family include the Ali-Mikhail-Haq, Gumbel,
Frank, and Joe copulas.
Next, we discuss using a background risk model to describe dependencies among negoti-
ated selling prices.
6.5 Background risk
We begin by introducing the background risk, which can be viewed as follows (cf., e.g., Gollier,
2001): Since decision making under uncertainty often takes place in the presence of multiple
risks, choices about endogenous risks must sometimes be made while facing exogenous risks
that are independent of the endogenous risks and not under the control of the agent. Such
exogenous risks are known as background risks.
Coming now back to our real estate problem, we assume that the negotiated selling prices
are aected by either the additive background risk or the multiplicative background risk. Specif-
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ically, under the additive background risk, the negotiated selling prices are given by
Zn;i = Yi + Y0 (6.32)
for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and in the case of the multiplicative background risk, the negotiated selling
prices are given by
Zn;i = Y0Yi; (6.33)
where Y0 denotes the background price. Random variables Yi of the negotiated selling prices
(stand-alone prices) without the presence of the background risk are assumed to be i.i.d. and
independent of Y0.
The additive and multiplicative background risks have been very popular. Vernic (1997)
has modelled the number of claims reported to the insurance company during a given time
interval in the presence of an additive background risk. Guiso et al. (1996) have discussed
how the demand for risky assets is aected by additive background risks. Alai et al. (2013)
have considered the eect an additive background risk has on the survival time of individual
policyholders. Doherty and Schlesinger (1983), and Meyer and Meyer (1998) have shown
that the outcome of an optimal insurance policy is dierent when an additive background risk
exists. For more on the application of the additive background risk, we refer to Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993), Gollier and Pratt (1996), and Vernic (2000). Asimit et
al. (2013) have evaluated risk measures, premiums, and capital allocation based on dependent
multi-losses, which follow the multivariate Pareto distribution of the second kind. The losses
in their model become dependent when a multiplicative background risk is present. For more
on the application of the multiplicative background risk, we refer to Nachman (1982) and Pratt
(1988).
Various studies in the literature have been reported related to the technique for finding a
pair of dependent random variables from three or more random variables that may or may not
be independent. This is commonly known as the trivariate reduction technique. The trivari-
ate reduction technique has been used to derive various bivariate distributions, including the
Cherian’s bivariate gamma distribution (Gupta and Nadarajah, 2006) and the bivariate Marshall
and Olkin’s exponential distribution (Marshall and Olkin, 1967).
The idea behind using the background risk to model the dependence among negotiated sell-
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ing prices is to create dependent random variables from more than two initially independent
random variables. In our case, random variables Y0;Y1; : : : ; Yn are independent but Zn;1, Zn;2,
: : : , Zn;n are dependent. Next, we obtain expressions for P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 >
un;n 1] and the (unconditional) probability P[H = 1] of the buyer purchasing a property un-
der additive or multiplicative background risks. Results are presented in the following two
subsections.
6.5.1 Additive background price
Under the additive background risk, we first obtain an expression for P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 >
un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1].
Theorem 6.5.1 Assume that the additive background risk is present. Furthermore, assume
that the distribution of each Yi is the same as that of the random variable Y for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = 1   E[
Qn
i=1 F¯Y(un;i   Y0)]
E[
Qn 1
i=1 F¯Y(un;i   Y0)]
: (6.34)
Proof Recall the expression for the conditional probability P[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 >
un; j 1] given in equation (6.24). We need to calculate the two terms P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n >
un;n] and P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] on the right-hand side of equation (6.24). We start
with the first term, which can be written as follows:
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = E[1fZn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;ng]:
Since Zn;i = Y0 + Yi for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, using the law of iterated expectations, we have
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = E[E[1fY0 + Y1 > un;1; : : : ; Y0 + Yn > un;ng j Y0]]
= E[E[1fY1 > un;1   Y0; : : : ; Yn > un;n   Y0g]]
= E[E[1fY1 > un;1   Y0g : : : 1fYn > un;n   Y0g]]
= E[E[1fY1 > un;1   Y0g] : : :E[1fYn > un;n   Y0g]]
= E
 nY
i=1
F¯Y(un;i   Y0)

: (6.35)
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Similarly, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (6.24) becomes
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = E
 n 1Y
i=1
F¯Y(un;i   Y0)

: (6.36)
Having thus calculated the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (6.24), we obtain
a new expression for the conditional probability P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1],
which is given by equation (6.34). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.1. 
Suppose that un;1 = un;2 =    = un;n = u. Then from Theorem 6.5.1, we immediately get
P[H = 1] = EY0[FY(u   Y0)](1   P[N = 0])
+

1   E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))
2]
E[F¯Y(u   Y0)]

(1   EY0[FY(u   Y0)])(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
(1   EY0[FY(u   Y0)])

1   E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))
j]
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0)) j 1]


j 1Y
k=2
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))k]
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))k 1]P[N  j]: (6.37)
When the number of properties on sale during the time interval (t0; t1] follows the Poisson
distribution with rate parameter  > 0, equation (6.37) becomes
P[H = 1] = EY0[FY(u   Y0)](1   e (t1 t0))
+

1   E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))
2]]
E[F¯Y(u   Y0)]

(1   EY0[FY(u   Y0)])
 (1   e (t1 t0)   (t1   t0)e (t1 t0))
+
1X
j=3
(1   EY0[FY(u   Y0)])

1   E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))
j]
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0)) j 1]


j 1Y
k=2
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))k]
E[(F¯Y(u   Y0))k 1]P[N  j]:
Next, we assume that the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distri-
bution with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, we assume that the reservation price
stays the same, that is, un;1 = un;2 =    = un;n = u. Then the conditional probability given by
equation (6.34) in the presence of the additive background risk becomes
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P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
= 1   EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
EY0[expf (n   1)1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
: (6.38)
We next obtain expressions for P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] and P[H = 1]
when Y0 follows the two-parameter exponential distribution, the uniform distribution, and the
log-normal distribution. Throughout the following consideration of the three distributions, we
assume that the conditions of Theorem 6.5.1 are satisfied.
Exponential background prices
Recall that the PDF of Y0 that follows the two-parameter exponential distribution with param-
eters 0 > 0 and 0 > 0 for y  0 is given by
fY0(y) = 0e
 0(y 0):
Theorem 6.5.2 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the two-parameter exponential
distribution with parameters 0 > 0 and 0  0. Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  u j Zn;1 > u; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > u] = 1   h1(n)h1(n   1) ; (6.39)
where, for j = n   1 and n,
h1( j) = 1fu   1  0g + 1fu   1 > 0g0
 1
1 j   0 expf 0(u   0   1)g
  1
1 j   0 expf 1 j(u   0   1)g

: (6.40)
Proof Recall the conditional probability given in equation (6.38), which is
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
= 1   EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
EY0[expf (n   1)1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
:
Next, we calculate the numerator and the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (6.38).
We begin with the numerator. When Y0 follows the two-parameter exponential distribution, we
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have
EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
=
Z 1
0
expf 1n(u   y   1)1fy < u   1gg0e 0(y 0)dy:
By considering the scenarios u   1  0 and u   1 > 0, we obtain
EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= 1fu   1  0g + 1fu   1 > 0g0
 1
1n   0 expf 0(u   0   1)g
  1
1n   0 expf 1n(u   0   1)g

: (6.41)
Similarly, the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (6.38) becomes
EY0[expf (n   1)1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= 1fu   1  0g + 1fu   1 > 0g0
 1
1(n   1)   0 expf 0(u   0   1)g
  1
1(n   1)   0 expf 1(n   1)(u   0   1)g

: (6.42)
Having thus calculated the numerator and the denominator, we obtain the conditional prob-
ability P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] given by equations (6.39) and (6.40). This
completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.2. 
From Theorem 6.5.2 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property in the most general case, which is given by equation (6.9), we immediately
get
P[H = 1] = w1(1   P[N = 0]) +

1   h1(2)
h1(1)

(1   w1)(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
(1   w1)

1   h1( j)
h1( j   1)
 j 1Y
k=2
h1(k)
h1(k   1)P[N  j];
where
w1 = 1fu   1 > 0g

1   0
 1
1   0 expf 0(u   0   1)g  
1
1   0 expf 1(u   0   1)g

:
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Uniform background prices
Recall that the PDF of Y0 that follows the uniform distribution with parameters a and b is given
by
fY0(y) =
1
b   a :
Theorem 6.5.3 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the uniform (a; b) distribution.
Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  u j Zn;1 > u; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > u] = 1   h2(n)h2(n   1) ; (6.43)
where, for j = n   1 and n,
h2( j) = Ifu   1  ag + Ifa < u   1  bg
 1
b   a
 1
1 j
  1
1 j
e 1 j(u a 1)

+ Ifu   1 > bg
 1
b   a
 1
1 j
e 1 j(u b 1)   1
1 j
e 1 j(u a 1)

: (6.44)
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.5.2, we calculate the numerator and the denominator
on the right-hand side of equation (6.38). We begin with the numerator. Since Y0 follows the
uniform distribution, we have
EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
=
Z b
a
expf 1n(u   y   1)1fy < u   1gg 1b   ady:
By considering the three scenarios u   1  a, a < u   1  b, and u   1 > b, we obtain
EY0[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= 1fu   1  ag +
 1
b   a
 1
1n
  1
1n
expf 1n(u   a   1)g

1fa < u   1  bg
+
 1
b   a
 1
1n
expf 1n(u   b   1)g   1
1n
expf 1n(u   a   1)g

 1fu   1 > bg: (6.45)
Similarly, the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (6.38) is written as follows:
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EY0[expf (n   1)1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= 1fu  1  ag+
 1
b   a
 1
1(n   1)  
1
1(n   1) expf 1(n  1)(u  a  1)g

1fa < u  1  bg
+
 1
b   a
 1
1(n   1) expf 1(n   1)(u   b   1)g  
1
1(n   1) expf 1(n   1)(u   a   1)g

 1fu   1 > bg: (6.46)
Having thus calculated the numerator and the denominator in equations (6.45) and (6.46),
we calculate the conditional probability P[Zn;n  u j Zn;1 > u; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > u] and arrive at
equations (6.43) and (6.44). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.3. 
From Theorem 6.5.3 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property given by equation (6.9), we immediately get
P[H = 1] = w2(1   P[N = 0]) +

1   h2(2)
h2(1)

(1   w2)(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
(1   w2)

1   h2( j)
h2( j   1)
 j 1Y
k=2
h2(k)
h2(k   1)P[N  j];
where
w2 = 1fa < u   1  bg

1   1
b   a
 1
1
  1
1
expf 1(u   a   1)g

+ 1fu   1 > bg

1   1
b   a
 1
1
expf 1(u   b   1)g   1
1
expf 1(u   a   1)g

:
Log-normal background prices
Recall that the PDF of Y0 that follows the three-parameter log-normal distribution with param-
eters  2 R,  > 0, and   0 is given by
fY0(y) =
1
(y   )p2 exp

  (ln(y   )   )
2
22

:
Theorem 6.5.4 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the three-parameter log-normal
distribution with parameters  2 R,  > 0, and   0. Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  u j Zn;1 > u; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > u] = 1   E[(h
(G0;1))n]
E[(h(G0;1))n 1]
; (6.47)
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where G0;1 follows the standard normal distribution and the function h(x) is given by
h(x) = exp

( 1u + 11 + 1 + 1 expf + xg)1

x <
ln(u   1   )   


: (6.48)
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.5.2, we calculate the numerator and the denominator
on the right-hand side of equation (6.38). We begin with the numerator:
E[expf n1(u Y0 1)1fY0 < u 1gg] = E[expf( 1u+11+1Y0)n1fY0 < u 1gg]: (6.49)
The background price Y0 is given by
Y0 = expf + G0;1g + : (6.50)
By substituting equation (6.50) into equation (6.49), we obtain
E[expf n1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= E

exp

( 1u + 11 + 1 + 1 expf + G0;1g + )n1

G0;1 <
ln(u   1   )   


:
(6.51)
Similarly, the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (6.38) is written as follows:
E[expf (n   1)1(u   Y0   1)1fY0 < u   1gg]
= E

exp

( 1u+11 +1+1 expf+G0;1g+)(n  1)1

G0;1 <
ln(u   1   )   


:
(6.52)
Having thus calculated the numerator and the denominator in equations (6.51) and (6.52),
we obtain the conditional probability P[Zn;n  u j Zn;1 > u; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > u] and establish
equations (6.47) and (6.48). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.4. 
From Theorem 6.5.4 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property given by equation (6.9), we immediately get
P[H = 1] = n1 + n2 + n3;
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where
n1 = (1   E[h(G0;1)])(1   P[N = 0]);
n2 =

1   E[(h
(G0;1))2]
E[h(G0;1)]

E[h(G0;1)](1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1]);
and
n3 =
1X
j=3
E[h(G0;1)]

1   E[(h
(G0;1)) j]
E[(h(G0;1)) j 1]
 j 1Y
k=2
E[(h(G0;1))k]
E[(h(G0;1))k 1]
P[N  j]:
6.5.2 Multiplicative background price
Under the multiplicative background risk, the negotiated selling price Zn;i is given in equation
(6.33). We next obtain an expression for P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1].
Theorem 6.5.5 Assume that the multiplicative background risk is present. Furthermore, as-
sume that the distribution of each Yi is the same as that of the random variable Y. Then we
have
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = 1   EY0[
Qn
i=1 F¯Y(un;i=Y0)]
EY0[
Qn 1
i=1 F¯Y(un;i=Y0)]
: (6.53)
Proof Recall the expression for the conditional probability P[Zn; j  un; j j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn; j 1 >
un; j 1] given in equation (6.24). Hence, we need to calculate the two terms P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n >
un;n] and P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] on the right-hand side of equation (6.24). We start
with the first term, which can be written as follows:
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = E[1fZn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;ng]:
Since Zn;i = Y0Yi for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, we have
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = E[1fY0Y1 > un;1; : : : ; Y0Yn > un;ng]:
Using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
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P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n > un;n] = EY0[EY[1fY0Y1; : : : ; Y0Yn > un;ng j Y0]]
= EY0

EY

1

Y1 >
un;1
Y0
; : : : ; Yn >
un;n
Y0

= EY0
 nY
i=1
F¯Y
un;i
Y0

: (6.54)
Similarly, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (6.24) can be written as follows:
P[Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = EY0
 n 1Y
i=1
F¯Y
un;i
Y0

: (6.55)
Using equations (6.54) and (6.55), we calculate the conditional probability P[Zn;n  un;n j
Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] and arrive at equation (6.53). This completes the proof of
Theorem 6.5.5. 
Next, we assume that the stand-alone prices Yi follow the two-parameter exponential dis-
tribution with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, we assume that the reservation
price stays the same, that is, let un;1 = un;2 =    = un;n = u. Then the conditional probability
becomes
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
= 1   EY0[expf 1n(u=Y0   1)1fu=Y0 > 1gg]
EY0[expf 1(n   1)(u=Y0   1)1fu=Y0 > 1gg]
: (6.56)
Using this formula, we obtain expressions for P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
and P[H = 1] when Y0 follows the two-parameter exponential distribution, the uniform distri-
bution, and the log-normal distribution. Throughout the following consideration of the three
distributions, we assume that conditions of Theorem 6.5.5 are satisfied.
Exponential background prices
Theorem 6.5.6 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the two-parameter exponential
distribution with parameters 0 > 0 and 0  0. Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = 1   g1(n)g1(n   1) ; (6.57)
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where, for j = n   1 and n,
g1( j) = 1fu=1  0g + 1fu=1 > 0g
Z u=1
0
e 1 j((u=y) 1)0e 0(y 0)dy: (6.58)
Proof Recall the conditional probability given in equation (6.56), which is
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1]
= 1   EY0[expf 1n(u=Y0   1)1fu=Y0 > 1gg]
EY0[expf 1(n   1)(u=Y0   1)1fu=Y0 > 1gg]
:
Next, we calculate the numerator and the denominator on the right-hand side of this equation.
We begin with the numerator. When Y0 follows the two-parameter exponential distribution, we
have
EY0

exp

  1n
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= 1
 u
1
 0

+ 1
 u
1
> 0
 Z u=1
0
exp

  1n
u
y
  1

0 expf 0(y   0)gdy: (6.59)
The denominator can be written as follows:
E

exp

  1(n   1)
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= 1
 u
1
 0

+ 1
 u
1
> 0
 Z u=1
0
exp

  1(n   1)
u
y
  1

0 expf 0(y   0)gdy: (6.60)
Having thus calculated the numerator and the denominator in equations (6.59) and (6.60),
we calculate the conditional probability P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] and
obtain equations (6.57) and (6.58). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.6. 
From Theorem 6.5.6 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property given in equation (6.9), we immediately get
P[H = 1] = (1   g1(1))(1   P[N = 0]) +

1   g1(2)
g1(1)

g1(1)(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
g1(1)

1   g1( j)
g1( j   1)
 j 1Y
k=2
g1(k)
g1(k   1)P[N  j]:
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Uniform background prices
Theorem 6.5.7 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the uniform distribution (a; b).
Then we have the formula
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = 1   g2(n)g2(n   1) ; (6.61)
where, for j = n and n   1,
g2( j) = 1
 u
1
 a

+ 1

a <
u
1
 b
 1
b   ae
11 j
Z u=1
a
e 1 ju=ydy
+ 1
 u
1
> b
 1
b   ae
11 j
Z b
a
e 1 ju=ydy: (6.62)
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.5.6, we calculate the numerator and the denominator
on the right-hand side of equation (6.56). We begin with the numerator. When Y0 follows the
uniform distribution, we have
EY0

exp

  1n
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

=
Z b
a
exp

  1
u
y
  1

1

y <
u
1
 1
b   ady:
By considering the scenarios u=1  a, a < u=1  b, and u=1 > b, we obtain
EY0

exp

  1n
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= 1
 u
1
 a

+ 1

a <
u
1
 b
 1
b   a expf11ng
Z u=1
a
exp

  1nuy

dy
+ 1
 u
1
> b
 1
b   a expf11ng
Z b
a
exp

  1nuy

dy: (6.63)
Similarly, the denominator can be written as follows:
EY0

exp

  1(n   1)
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= 1
 u
1
 a

+ 1

a <
u
1
 b
 1
b   ae
11(n 1)
Z u=1
a
e 1(n 1)u=ydy
+ 1
 u
1
> b
 1
b   ae
11(n 1)
Z b
a
e 1(n 1)u=ydy: (6.64)
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Using these results for the numerator and the denominator in equations (6.63) and (6.64),
we calculate the conditional probability P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] and
obtain equations (6.61) and (6.62). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.7. 
From Theorem 6.5.7 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property given in equation (6.9), we immediately get
P[H = 1] = (1   g2(1))(1   P[N = 0])
+

1   g2(2)
g2(1)

g2(1)(1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
g2(1)

1   g2( j)
g2( j   1)
 j 1Y
k=2
g2(k)
g2(k   1)P[N  j]:
Log-normal background prices
Theorem 6.5.8 Let the stand-alone prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution
with parameters 1 > 0 and 1  0. Furthermore, let Y0 follow the three-parameter log-normal
distribution with parameters  2 R,  > 0, and   0. Then the conditional probability given
in equation (6.56) becomes
P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] = 1   E[(g
(G0;1))n]
E[(g(G0;1))n 1]
; (6.65)
where G0;1 follows the standard normal distribution and the function g(x) is given by
g(x) = exp

1
 u
expf + xg +    1

1

x <
ln(u=1   )   


: (6.66)
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.5.6, we calculate the numerator and the denominator
on the right-hand side of equation (6.56). We begin with the numerator:
EY0

exp

  1n
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= EY0

exp

  1
 u
Y0
  1

n1

Y0 <
u
1

: (6.67)
The background price is given by
Y0 = expf + G0;1g + : (6.68)
By substituting equation (6.68) into equation (6.67), we obtain
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EY0

exp

  1n
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= E

exp

  1
 u
expf + G0;1g +    1

n1

G0;1 <
ln(u=1      )


: (6.69)
Similarly, the denominator can be written as follows:
EY0

exp

  1(n   1)
 u
Y0
  1

1
 u
Y0
> 1

= E

exp

  1
 u
expf + G0;1g +    1

(n   1)1

G0;1 <
ln(u=1   )   


: (6.70)
Using the above results for the numerator and the denominator, we calculate the conditional
probability P[Zn;n  un;n j Zn;1 > un;1; : : : ; Zn;n 1 > un;n 1] and arrive at equations (6.65) and
(6.66). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.5.8. 
From Theorem 6.5.8 and the formula for the (unconditional) probability of the buyer pur-
chasing a property given in equation (6.9), we immediately get
P[H = 1] = (1   E[g(G0;1)])(1   P[N = 0])
+

1   E[(g
(G0;1))2]
E[g(G0;1)]

E[g(G0;1)](1   P[N = 0]   P[N = 1])
+
1X
j=3
E[g(G0;1)]

1   E[(g
(G0;1)) j]
E[(g(G0;1)) j 1]
 j 1Y
k=2
E[(g(G0;1))k]
E[(g(G0;1))k 1]
P[N  j]:
Note that when the negotiated selling prices are independent of the number of properties
on sale, the probability P[H = 1] of the buyer purchasing one property is written in terms of
P[N  j] for j = 1; 2; : : : . Hence, we must obtain the tail probability P[N  j] and thus
next review literature studies related to finding the bounds and direct representations of the tail
probabilities for discrete distributions.
6.6 Literature review related to bounds on tail probabilities
for discrete distributions
Various methods for obtaining the bounds and direct representations of the tail probabilities
for discrete distributions have been reported in the literature. Approaches based on the Markov
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inequality include: the Cherno bound (Cherno, 1952), the moment bound (Philips and Nel-
son, 1995), the factorial moment bound (Naveau, 1997), and the fractional moments (Goria
and Tagliani, 2003).
In addition to Markov inequality based techniques, Peizer and Pratt (1968), Pratt (1968),
Glynn (1987), and Fox and Glynn (1988) have considered the normal approximation method.
Gideon and Gurland (1971) have used a weighted sum of exponential distributions to estimate
the tail probability. Andrews (1973) has introduced the Andrews approximation. Ross (1998)
and Klar (2000) have discussed the importance sampling identity approach.
Next, we present the bounds and direct representations of the tail probabilities for the Pois-
son, negative binomial, binomial, log-series, and zeta distributions that we have found in the
literature.
Tail probability of the Poisson distribution
When a random variable N follows the Poisson distribution with mean  > 0, then the proba-
bility mass function of N is given by
P[N = n] = e 
n
n!
for n = 0; 1; 2; : : : :
Gideon and Gurland (1971) have used the chi-squared distribution to obtain
P[N  n]  1   P[2v > 2] + P[N = n];
where v = 2(n+ 1). Recall that a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, which we
denote by 2k , is the distribution of a sum of the squares of k independent standard normal ran-
dom variables (cf., e.g., Timm, 2002). Furthermore, Glynn (1987) has obtained the following
upper bound
P[N  n] 

1  


n + 1
m 1 n+m 1X
k=n
e 
k
k!
;
where n >   1 and m  1. For more results on the tail probability of the Poisson distribution,
we refer to Gross and Hosmer (1978), and Klar (2000).
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Tail probability of the negative binomial distribution
When N follows the negative binomial distribution with parameters r > 0 and  > 0, then the
probability mass function of N is given by
P[N = n] =
 
r + n   1
n
! 1
1 + 
r 
1 + 
n
for n = 0; 1; : : : :
Best and Gipps (1974) have shown that
P[N > n]  1  
Z n+0:5+r(1 p1)=(2 p1)
h
g

y;
4r(1   p1)
(2   p1)2 ;
2   p1
2p1

dy;
where
p1 =
1
1 + 
;
h = max

0;
r(1   p1)
2   p1   0:5

;
and
g(y; a; b) =
1
ba (a)
ya 1e y=b
for y > 0, a > 0, and b > 0. Klar (2000) has proven that if r > 1 and n  r(1   p1)=p1, then
1
p1
P[N = n] < P[N  n] <

1   n + r
n + 1
(1   p1)
 1
P[N = n];
and if r < 1 and n  r(1   p1)=p1, then

1   n + r
n + 1
(1   p1)
 1
P[N = n] < P[N  n] < 1
p1
P[N = n]:
Tail probability of the binomial distribution
When N follows a binomial distribution with parameters m = 1; 2; : : : and 0  p  1, then the
probability mass function of N is given by
P[N = n] =
 
m
n
!
pn(1   p)m n for n = 0; 1; : : : ;m:
Klar (2000) has shown that for mp  n  m, the lower and upper bounds of P[N  n] are as
follows:
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m
n
!
pn(1   p)m n  P[N  n]  (n + 1)(1   p)
n + 1   (m + 1)p
 
m
n
!
pn(1   p)m n:
For more on the tail probability of the binomial distribution, we refer to Gross and Hosmer
(1978).
Tail probability of the log-series distribution
When N follows the log-series distribution with parameter 0  p < 1, then the probability
mass function of N is given by
P[N = n] =
 1
ln(1   p)
pn
n
for n = 1; 2; : : : :
Klar (2000) has presented the following lower and upper bounds of P[N  n]:

1   np
n + 1
 1  1
ln(1   p)
pn
n
< P[N  n] < (1   p) 1  1
ln(1   p)
pn
n
:
Tail probability of the zeta distribution
When N follows the zeta distribution with parameter s > 1, then the probability mass function
of N is given by
P[N = n] =
n s
1(s)
for n = 1; 2; : : : ;
where 1(s) =
P1
k=1 1=k
s. Klar (2000) has obtained the following lower and upper bounds of
P[N  n]:
n
s   1
n s
1(s)
< P[N  n] <
 n
n   1
s 1 n
s   1
n s
1(s)
for n  2.
6.7 An illustrative example
We now calculate the (unconditional) probability of purchasing a condominium or a detached
property in the London and St. Thomas area under assumptions made in Section 6.2. The data,
which are reported in the London and St. Thomas Association of Realtors statistical report
from the year 2012, includes the average prices of condominiums and detached properties
for each month in the year 2012, which we reproduce in Table 6.2. The average number of
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condominiums and detached properties sold, and their variances for each month from the year
2003 to 2012 are reproduced in Table 6.6.
Note from equation (6.2) that to calculate P[H = 1], we first need to obtain , which is the
CDF of each Zn;i, and then G(1   (u)), which is the probability generating function of N. In
other words, we need to find parameter values for the distributions of Zn;i and N.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: In Subsection 6.7.1, we obtain expressions
for  when the negotiated selling prices follow the exponential, uniform, and log-normal dis-
tributions. We then estimate the parameter values of these distributions for condominiums and
detached properties sold in May and December of 2012. In Subsection 6.7.2, we find a suitable
distribution to model the number of condominiums and detached properties available on the
market. In Subsection 6.7.3, we present plots of the (unconditional) probabilities of purchas-
ing condominiums and detached properties in the months of May and December of 2012, for
various negotiated selling price distributions.
6.7.1 Parameter estimates of the negotiated selling price distributions
Here we consider three distributions for the negotiated selling prices: the exponential, uni-
form, and log-normal distributions. When negotiated selling prices follow the two-parameter
exponential distribution with parameters  > 0 and u0, then we have
(u) = 1   expf (u   u0)g for u > u0  0:
When negotiated selling prices follow the uniform distribution (u0; u1), for 0  u0 < u < u1,
we have
(u) =
u   u0
u1   u0 :
When negotiated selling prices follow the three-parameter log-normal distribution with param-
eters 1 2 R,  > 0, and u0  0, then we have
(u) = 
 ln(u   u0)   1


for u > u0:
Next, we estimate parameter values of the three selling price distributions for condomini-
ums and detached properties sold in the months of May and December of 2012. The parameter
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estimates are based on the average prices of condominiums and detached properties in the Lon-
don and St. Thomas area for each month in the year 2012, which are presented in Table 6.2.
The sample data are taken from London St. Thomas Association of Realtors statistical report
from the year 2012.
Month Condominiums Detached properties
January 169; 069 236; 101
February 169; 897 252; 523
March 170; 193 251; 533
April 166; 717 266; 457
May 169; 358 265; 756
June 180; 749 252; 451
July 176; 594 260; 172
August 174; 475 242; 042
September 160; 869 246; 376
October 182; 223 257; 302
November 164; 593 252; 259
December 168; 304 254; 740
Table 6.2: Average prices of condominiums and detached properties.
Parameter estimates for condominiums sold in May of 2012
From Table 6.2, we see that the average price for condominiums sold in May is $169; 358. The
lowest average price is $160; 869 in September. To estimate parameter values of the negotiated
selling price distribution for condominiums sold in May, we equate the mean of the selling
price distribution to $169; 360. This value is obtained by rounding up from the average price
$169; 358 in May. We also equate the minimum negotiated selling price to $150; 000, which is
$10869 less than the lowest average price of $160; 869. Next, we obtain parameter estimates
for the two-parameter exponential, uniform, and three-parameter log-normal distributions.
Assume that Zn;i follows the two-parameter exponential distribution with parameters  and
u0, where u0 is the minimum negotiated selling price for condominiums sold in May, and thus
u0 = 150; 000: (6.71)
Since the mean is $169; 360, we have u0 + (1=) = 169; 360. Hence, we immediately get
 =
1
19360
:
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Assume that Zn;i follows the uniform distribution (u0; u1), where u0 is the minimum negoti-
ated selling price for condominiums sold in the month of May, and thus
u0 = 150; 000: (6.72)
Since the mean of the uniform distribution is $169; 360, we have (u0+u1)=2 = 169; 360. Hence,
we immediately get
u1 = 188; 720:
Assume that Zn;i follows the three-parameter log-normal distribution with parameters u0,
1, and , where u0 is the minimum negotiated selling price for condominiums in the month of
May, and thus
u0 = 150; 000: (6.73)
The mean of the three-parameter log-normal distribution is $169; 360. Assume that the stan-
dard deviation of the log-normal distribution is the same as that of the average price of con-
dominiums from January to December, which is $6338. Then u0 + e1+
2=2 = 169; 360 and
e21+
2
(e
2   1) = 63382. Hence, we immediately get
1 = 9:8 and  = 0:35:
Parameter estimates for condominiums sold in December of 2012
From Table 6.2, we see that the average price of condominiums sold in December is $168; 304.
To estimate parameter values of the negotiated selling price distribution for condominiums
sold in December, we equate the mean of the selling price distribution to $168; 300 (rounding
down from $168; 304). The minimum negotiated selling price remains at $150; 000. Similar to
the parameter estimates for condominiums sold in May, the following results are obtained for
condominiums sold in December:
 When negotiated selling prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 150; 000 and  = 1=18300.
 When negotiated selling prices follow the uniform distribution, then the parameter esti-
mates are u0 = 150; 000 and u1 = 186; 600.
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 When negotiated selling prices follow the three-parameter log-normal distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 150; 000, 1 = 9:7, and  = 0:37.
Parameter estimates for detached properties sold in May of 2012
From Table 6.2, we see that the average price for detached properties sold in May is $265; 756,
and the lowest average price of detached properties is $242; 042 in August. To estimate pa-
rameter values of the selling price distribution for detached properties sold in May, we equate
the mean of the selling price distribution to $265; 800 (rounding up from $265; 756). We also
equate the minimum selling price to $230; 000, which is $12042 less than the minimum aver-
age price of $242; 042. Similar to the parameter estimates for condominiums sold in May, the
following results are obtained for detached properties sold in May:
 When negotiated selling prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 230; 000 and  = 1=35800.
 When negotiated selling prices follow the uniform distribution, then the parameter esti-
mates are u0 = 230; 000 and u1 = 301; 600.
 When negotiated selling prices follow the three-parameter log-normal distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 230; 000, 1 = 10:5, and  = 0:25.
Parameter estimates for detached properties sold in December of 2012
From Table 6.2, we see that the average price of detached properties sold is $254; 740 in De-
cember. To estimate parameter values of the negotiated selling price distribution for detached
properties sold in December, we equate the mean of the negotiated selling price distribution
to $254; 700 (rounding down from $254; 740). The minimum negotiated selling price remains
at $230; 000. Similar to the parameter estimates for condominiums sold in May, the following
results are obtained for detached properties sold in December:
 When negotiated selling prices follow the two-parameter exponential distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 230; 000 and  = 1=24700.
 When negotiated selling prices follow the uniform distribution, then the parameter esti-
mates are u0 = 230; 000 and u1 = 279; 400.
128 Chapter 6. Likelihood of purchasing a property
 When negotiated selling prices follow the three-parameter log-normal distribution, then
the parameter estimates are u0 = 230; 000, 1 = 10:1, and  = 0:35.
Results are presented in Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.
Condominiums Detached properties
Month u0  u0 
May 150; 000 1=19360 230; 000 1=35800
December 150; 000 1=18300 230; 000 1=24700
Table 6.3: Parameter values of the two-parameter exponential distribution.
Condominiums Detached properties
Month u0 u1 u0 u1
May 150; 000 188; 720 230; 000 301; 600
December 150; 000 186; 600 230; 000 279; 400
Table 6.4: Parameter values of the uniform distribution.
Condominiums Detached properties
Month u0 1  u0 1 
May 150; 000 9:8 0:35 230; 000 10:5 0:25
December 150; 000 9:7 0:37 230; 000 10:1 0:35
Table 6.5: Parameter values of the log-normal distribution.
6.7.2 Finding the distribution of N
In Table 6.6, we have recorded the average number of condominiums and detached properties
sold, as well as their variances for all months from the year 2003 to 2012. Although the number
of properties sold is not the same as the number of properties available on the market, this is the
most relevant information we have managed to gather over the 10-year period. Note that there
is a significant dierence between the mean and the variance of properties sold each month.
Hence, it is not appropriate to assume that N follows the Poisson distribution. We shall next
find a more suitable discrete distribution for the random variable of the number N of properties
available on the market. We consider five discrete distributions: binomial, log-series, zeta,
hypergeometric, and negative binomial.
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Condominiums Detached
Month Average Variance Average Variance
January 116 8682 337 9698
February 132 280 490 2765
March 157 645 669 6243
April 170 420 706 3656
May 191 673 762 5592
June 180 401 733 2965
July 169 1047 673 4795
August 155 554 612 3650
September 131 300 549 2152
October 121 357 518 1322
November 106 259 467 4738
December 82 68 300 1253
Table 6.6: The averages and variances of sold properties for each month from the year 2003 to
2012 (numbers are rounded down to the nearest integer).
The binomial distribution
When N follows the binomial distribution with parameters n = 1; 2; : : : and 0  p  1, then
the expectation and the variance of N are given by
E[N] = np and Var[N] = np(1   p):
Note that E[N]  Var[N] always holds true. This contradicts results in Table 6.6, except
for condominiums sold in December. We now equate E[N] and Var[N] to the mean and the
variance of the number of condominiums sold in December. Hence, np = 82, and np(1   p) =
68. Consequently,
n = 480 and p = 0:171:
The log-series distribution
When N follows the log-series distribution with parameter 0  p < 1, then the expectation and
the variance of N are given by
E[N] =
 1
ln(1   p)
p
1   p
and
Var[N] =  p p + ln(1   p)
(1   p)2(ln(1   p))2 :
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If we equate E[N] and Var[N] to the mean and the variance of the number of condomini-
ums and detached properties sold in each month, no solution can be obtained. Therefore, we
conclude that the log-series distribution is not suitable for N.
The zeta distribution
When N follows the zeta distribution with parameter s > 1, then the expectation and the
variance of N are given by
E[N] =
1(s   1)
1(s)
for s > 2
and
Var[N] =
1(s)1(s   2)   (1(s   1))2
(1(s))2
for s > 3;
where
1(s) =
1X
n=1
1=ns:
Standard packages are available to compute 1(s). For the sake of simplicity, we consider other
discrete distributions.
The hypergeometric distribution
When N follows the hypergeometric distribution with parameters n (n = 0; 1; : : : ;M), M (M =
0; 1; : : : ), and K (K = 0; 1; : : : ;M), such that max(0; n + K   M)  k  min(K; n), then the
probability mass function, the expectation, and the variance of N are given by
P[N = k] =

K
k

M K
n k

M
n
 ;
E[N] = n
K
M
;
Var[N] = n
K
M
M   K
M
M   n
M   1 :
We note that E[N]  Var[N] always holds true. The conclusion is similar to that of the
binomial distribution, that is, the hypergeometric distribution is not suitable for modelling the
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distribution of N, except for the number of condominiums available in December.
The negative binomial distribution
When N follows a negative binomial distribution with parameters r > 0 and  > 0, then the
expectation and the variance of N are given by
E[N] = r and Var[N] = r(1 + ):
Next, we equateE[N] andVar[N] to the mean and the variance of the number of condominiums
and detached properties sold in each month. For condominiums sold in January, we have
r = 116 and r(1 + ) = 8682:
Consequently,
r = 1:571 and  = 73:845:
Similarly, we obtain parameter estimates for r and  for the number of condominiums and
detached properties available in each month. Results are presented in Table 6.7. We see that
Condominiums Detached
Month r  r 
January 1:571 73:845 12:132 27:777
February 117:730 1:121 105:538 4:643
March 50:510 3:108 80:294 8:332
April 115:600 1:470 168:961 4:178
May 75:687 2:524 120:216 6:338
June 146:606 1:228 240:721 3:045
July 32:530 5:195 109:881 6:125
August 60:213 2:574 123:286 4:964
September 101:544 1:290 188:023 2:920
October 62:038 1:950 333:736 1:552
November 73:438 1:443 51:063 9:146
December  480:286  0:171 94:439 3:177
Table 6.7: Negative binomial distribution with parameters r and .
the negative binomial distribution is a reasonable choice for the distribution of N, except for
condominiums available in December. Hence, we use the binomial distribution to model the
number of condominiums available in December.
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6.7.3 Plots of the probabilities of purchasing a property
Here we plot the probabilities of a buyer purchasing a condominium or a detached property in
May and December. For the negotiated selling price distributions, we use results of Tables 6.3,
6.4, and 6.5. For the distribution of N, our assumptions are as follows:
 The number of condominiums available on the market in May follows the negative bino-
mial distribution with parameters r = 75:687 and  = 2:524.
 The number of condominiums available on the market in December follows the binomial
distribution with parameters n = 480 and p = 0:171.
 The number of detached properties available on the market in May follows the negative
binomial distribution with parameters r = 120:216 and  = 6:338.
 The number of detached properties available on the market in December follows the
negative binomial distribution with parameters r = 94:439 and  = 3:177.
Figure 6.1: The probabilities of purchasing condominiums (left panel) and detached properties
(right panel) in May (solid line) and December (dashed line) when negotiated selling prices
follow the exponential distribution.
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Figure 6.2: The probabilities of purchasing condominiums (left panel) and detached properties
(right panel) in May (solid line) and December (dashed line) when negotiated selling prices
follow the uniform distribution.
Figure 6.3: The probabilities of purchasing condominiums (left panel) and detached properties
(right panel) in May (solid line) and December (dashed line) when negotiated selling prices
follow the log-normal distribution.
Chapter 7
Concluding remarks and future work
7.1 Concluding remarks
When multiple parties are involved in the decision making process, the final outcome depends
on everybody’s decision. To illustrate how decisions might be made in such situations, we have
considered two scenarios: one in insurance and another in real estate industries. Of course,
numerous other scenarios can be considered, but each of them usually carries some specific
features that cannot always be generalized easily or naturally.
Specifically, in the insurance industry, we have discussed two criteria for finding an optimal
reinsurance policy that is beneficial to both the insurer and the reinsurer. The variance reduc-
tion approach was the first introduced criterion. We have shown that to maximize the variance
reduction, the covariance(s) should be maximized. We have also demonstrated through a nu-
merical example that maximizing the correlation coecient with respect to the retention is not
a suitable criterion.
Under facultative reinsurance, we have considered using the variance reduction approach
to find optimal reinsurance in three cases. In the first case, conditions for the optimal retention
have been obtained when the policy limit is already determined. In the second case, conditions
for the optimal policy limit have been derived when the retention is already determined. In
the final case, we have proposed a negotiation process when both the retention and the policy
limit are still negotiable. Numerical results have been presented for the first thirteen rounds of
negotiations.
Under treaty reinsurance, we have used the variance reduction approach to optimize the
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reinsurance policy in two cases. In the first case, the claim size of each insurance policy is
independent of time. We have used four examples to illustrate how the optimal retention is
aected by parameter values of the distribution of the number of claims that require a claim
payment during a considered time interval. In the second case, claim sizes depend on preceding
inter-claim times. By adopting the approach of Sendova and Zitikis (2012), we have obtained
an explicit expression for the covariance of the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s shares of claims.
Next, to illustrate how the optimal retention is aected by time, two numerical examples have
been presented.
In addition to the variance reduction approach, we considered a method based on the CTE.
A connection between these two methods has been established. Explicit expressions for the
CTEs of the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s shares of the claim have also been presented. Fur-
thermore, we have obtained the optimal retention using theCTE-based criterion when the total
claim amount follows the exponential distribution and also the two-parameter Pareto distribu-
tion.
As to the illustrative scenario in the real estate industry, we have formulated the probability
of the buyer purchasing one property under various scenarios. We started by assuming that the
reservation price stays the same, and that the negotiated selling prices are i.i.d. One or more of
these assumptions were then dropped as our research progressed.
When the assumption of independent negotiated selling prices was dropped, three methods
for modelling the dependence structure among selling prices were discussed. Under the method
of direct representation, joint survival functions of several multivariate distributions from past
studies have been provided. Next, under the method of copula representation, we have used the
multivariate Pareto distribution of the second kind as an example to show how the joint survival
function can be obtained from the survival copula. Finally, the additive and multiplicative
background risk models have been discussed in detail.
In an illustrative example for properties in the London and St. Thomas area, we have ob-
tained parameter estimates for three negotiated selling price distributions. Furthermore, we
have successfully determined distributions that are suitable for modelling the number of con-
dominiums and detached properties available on the market. Finally, we have calculated the
probability of the buyer purchasing a condominium or a detached property in two months: May
and December.
Overall, this thesis proposes methodologies that facilitate decision making when multi-
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ple parties are involved in the process. Certain adjustments may be required to make the
methodologies more attractive from the practical point of view. Nevertheless, the developed
approaches are very general in nature and can be applied to various fields beyond insurance
and real estate.
7.2 Future work
In the first illustrative scenario, we have proposed methodologies for optimizing reinsurance
policies in the excess of loss form. We plan to apply the proposed methodologies to other
forms of reinsurance policies (e.g., quota share reinsurance). Furthermore, when the variance
reduction approach was applied under treaty reinsurance, we assumed independent claim sizes.
We will extend our model to include dependent claim sizes. Finally, we only considered the
CTE-based criterion under facultative reinsurance. We plan to also investigate the case when
the method of treaty reinsurance is assumed.
In the second illustrative scenario, we have assumed only the buyer and the seller are in-
volved in buying or negotiating selling properties. We plan to consider the involvement of
agents. We can also extend our model to include other factors (e.g., inflation) that influence the
negotiated selling prices. Furthermore, to incorporate the feature of seasonal trends, we plan
to use the Poisson process with a variety of periodic and other intensity functions to model the
number of properties available on the market (cf., e.g., Bebbington and Zitikis, 2004).
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that situations like the one just discussed about
buying or selling arise in a variety of contexts, including of course insurance: indeed, a person
may have a budget in mind and searches for an insurance policy to purchase. In short, the
results of this thesis can be extended to a multitude of scenarios, well beyond the two illustrative
ones considered in the thesis.
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